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uring the 2016 presidential election, President Donald J. Trump 
faced three lawsuits accusing him of fraud, racketeering, and 
violation of a variety of other consumer protection laws. These cases 
focused on a series of wealth seminars President Trump called “Trump 
University,” which collected over $40 million from consumers seeking 
to learn President Trump’s real estate investing strategies. Although 
these consumer protection cases were civil proceedings, the underlying 
legal elements in several counts the plaintiff sought to prove run 
parallel to the legal elements of serious crimes under both state and 
federal law. Somehow lost in the election’s cacophony was the question 
of whether President Trump’s alleged fraudulent behavior rises to the 
level of an impeachable offense under the impeachment clause of the 
Constitution of the United States. 
Addressing this issue of public concern, this Article explores 
whether the United States House of Representatives could lawfully 
impeach President Trump and whether the United States Senate could 
convict President Trump for fraud and racketeering in connection with 
Trump University. This Article does not address whether impeachment 
will happen or even if it should happen. Instead, it focuses on whether 
Congress has the legal right to impeach President Trump should it 
choose to do so. Part I provides a summary of the evidence assembled 
in the three recently settled Trump University civil lawsuits. Part II 
describes the legal claims involved in each matter. Part III briefly 
summarizes the applicable law of presidential impeachment under the 
United States Constitution and analyzes whether Congress could 
reasonably conclude that President Trump’s actions in connection with 
Trump University are impeachable offenses. In this respect, I consider 
whether fraud and racketeering are high crimes or misdemeanors, the 
effect of settlement of civil litigation on Congress’ impeachment rights, 
and whether impeachment is permissible for preincumbency offenses. 
Finally, I offer concluding thoughts, considering in particular the policy 
implications of an American president with a documented history of 
fraud and racketeering. 
D
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I 
TRUMP UNIVERSITY BUSINESS PRACTICES 
A. “Every single resource Mr. Trump has at his disposal” 
In 2005, Trump University opened to much fanfare in a press 
conference at President Trump’s Manhattan corporate offices.1 In a 
promotional video President Trump explained: “At Trump University, 
we teach success. That’s what it’s all about—success. It’s going to 
happen to you.”2 Similar to elite private universities, Trump University 
had a vintage trademark featuring a British heraldic lion. But, unlike 
other universities, Trump University did not have a campus, grade its 
students, or offer degrees. Reflecting its unorthodox roots, early press 
descriptions of Trump’s new school explained that “[c]ourses will cost 
$300 and will take one to two weeks to complete.”3 Advertising for 
Trump University focused almost exclusively on Trump’s role in 
developing the curriculum and selecting the instructors.4 As a narrator 
explained in the promotional video: “Donald Trump is without 
question the world’s most famous business man. As a real estate 
developer he has reshaped the New York skyline with some of that 
great city’s most prestigious and elegant buildings. Now Donald Trump 
brings his years of experience to the world of business education with 
the launch of Trump University.”5 One newspaper advertisement 
extoled: “He’s the most celebrated entrepreneur on earth. He’s earned 
more in a day than most people do in a lifetime. He’s living a life many 
men and women only dream about. And now he’s ready to share—with 
Americans like you—the Trump process for investing in today’s once-
in-a-lifetime real estate market.”6 Trump University distributed 
similarly breathless marketing materials including newspaper ads and 
direct mail solicitation letters—all with large color photographs of a 
smiling Donald Trump in a suit and tie—to cities across the country. 
Capitalizing on President Trump’s name recognition, Trump 
University advertisements emphasized that President Trump 
 
1 DAVID CAY JOHNSTON, THE MAKING OF DONALD TRUMP 117–18 (Gene Roberts & 
Glenn Kramon eds., 2016). 
2 Trump Univ., Trump University Intro, YOUTUBE (Dec. 5, 2009), https://www.youtube 
.com/watch?v=BvaaeHP9xtQ. 
3 Greg Levine, Trump University Founded for Student “Customers,” FORBES (May 23, 
2005, 3:32 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2005/05/23/0523autofacescan06.html. 
4 Trump Univ., supra note 2. 
5 Id. 
6 See, e.g., Trump Univ., The Time to Invest in Texas Real Estate is NOW!, HOUS. 
CHRON., Sept. 24, 2009, at B4. 
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“handpicked” Trump University instructors who taught President 
Trump’s own real estate strategies, techniques, and “Secrets of Real 
Estate Marketing.”7 Trump University staff were trained to “[t]ake 
every opportunity to emphasize that they need to learn the Trump way 
for continued and growing success!”8 Instructors often boasted of 
having close personal relationships with President Trump.9 Scripts for 
the ninety-minute sessions were designed to reinforce the perception 
that instructors were confidants of President Trump.10 For example, the 
advertisements reinforced those claims by quoting President Trump: “I 
can turn anyone into a successful real estate investor, including you.”11 
Similarly, President Trump explained, “We’re going to have professors 
and adjunct professors that are absolutely terrific—terrific people, 
terrific brains, successful. We are going to have the best of the best . . . 
. These are all people that are handpicked by me.”12  President Trump 
continued, “We’re going to teach you better than the business schools 
are going to teach you, and I went to the best business school. We’re 
going to teach you better . . . . I think it’s going to be a better education 
and it’s going to be what you need to know.”13 A letter signed by 
President Trump soliciting enrollment in Trump University explained, 
“[M]y hand-picked instructors will share my techniques, which took 
my entire career to develop. Then just copy exactly what I’ve done and 
get rich.”14 
Students, intrigued by these promises, began their Trump University 
studies by attending widely marketed, “free” ninety-minute 
introductory classes. Advertisements for these classes promised that 
students would “learn from Donald Trump’s handpicked instructor a 
 
7 Id. 
8 TRUMP UNIV., TRUMP UNIVERSITY 2010 PLAYBOOK 104, 109 (2010) [hereinafter 
PLAYBOOK]. 
9 See, e.g., Exhibits to the Affirmation of Assistant Attorney General Tristan C. Snell In 
Support of the Verified Petition at Exhibit K13 Affidavit of Nora Hanna ¶ 6, New York v. 
Trump Entrepreneur Initiative LLC, No. 451463/2013 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 26, 2013) 
[hereinafter Exhibits to Snell Affirmation] (“He said that he was Mr. Trump’s ‘right-hand 
man.’”). 
10 See, e.g., PLAYBOOK supra note 8, at 108 (instructing staff to introduce speakers with 
the following line, “It is now my pleasure to introduce one of Donald Trump’s top 
instructors. He has been hand selected because of his expertise and knowledge in the real-
estate business.”). 
11 Trump Univ., supra note 6. 
12 Trump Univ., supra note 2. 
13 Id. 
14 Exhibits to Snell Affirmation, supra note 9, at Exhibit M4 Letter of Donald J. Trump 
000409. 
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systematic method for investing in real estate that anyone can use 
effectively. You’ll learn foreclosure investing from the inside out. 
You’ll learn how to finance your deals using other people’s money. 
You’ll learn how to overcome your fear of getting started.”15 
However, the Trump University’s confidential employee training 
manual, called the Trump University Playbook, explained that these 
ninety-minute seminars were not intended to actually teach students.16 
Rather, the goal of these sessions, called “previews” in the Trump 
University Playbook, was to “set the hook” in order to sell three-day 
seminars, such as the Profit from Real Estate seminars which cost 
$1495.17 The Trump University Playbook summarized the point of 
previews in a heading: “Preview Strategy – 90 Minute Selling.”18 The 
book explains, 
In a one-off selling situation, you are selling to someone who you 
may or may not see again. You must form a connection in a one to 
two hour period. And, it must start as soon as the future student walks 
into the registration area in a preview scenario. The prospective 
students must make an immediate decision, based on the opportunity, 
brand, and the newly formed relationship, because they have the most 
to lose by not making the decision.19 
Despite promising to teach “a systematic method for investing in real 
estate” in advertisements, the Trump University Playbook specifically 
instructed staff to “[n]ever imply [students] will learn a particular 
strategy at the preview.”20 Despite advertisements promising that 
“[a]ttendees receive a FREE Secrets of Real Estate Marketing CD-
Rom,” the  Trump University Playbook instructed staff to “[n]ever 
distribute materials unless you have some form of payment, as we want 
to use these as a sales tool.”21 Sales staff often falsely promised or 
implied that President Trump would appear at the three-day trainings. 
But as one customer explained, “[w]e were also told that at the three-
day seminar we would get to have our pictures taken with Donald 
 
15 Exhibit E at 192, Cohen v. Trump, No. 13-cv-2519-GPC-WVG (S.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 
2014), ECF No. 220-3. 
16 PLAYBOOK, supra note 8, at 6, 19. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 98. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 104; compare Trump Univ., supra note 6, with PLAYBOOK, supra note 8, at 104. 
21 PLAYBOOK, supra note 8, at 117. Compare Trump Univ., supra note 6, with 
PLAYBOOK, supra note 8, at 117. 
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Trump. It ended up being a cardboard cutout of Mr. Trump.”22 Trump 
University staff were expected to “Create A Sense Of Urgency,” get 
“in A Sales Mindset,” and be “Ready to Sell, Sell, Sell!”23 
Thousands of students agreed to purchase three-day seminars.24 But, 
even in these longer courses, the focus at Trump University remained 
squarely on upselling consumers to a more expensive, next-level 
service.25 Rather than presenting a meaningful educational program, 
President Trump’s three-day “Profit from Real-Estate Workshop” was, 
in the words of the Trump University business handbook, a “sales 
environment.”26 Sales practices at each seminar were systematically 
designed, painstakingly choreographed, and implemented ruthlessly.27 
The Trump University Playbook explains, 
Because we decide what happens in the training, an attendee must 
react to what we say. They don’t have a choice. For example, we can 
spend hours and hours planning a question that they must deal with 
and give an answer to within seconds. We also have the advantage of 
testing the question out on hundreds of people and adjusting it to 
increase our chances for a desirable response. The attendee does not 
have the luxury of “practicing” his or her answer. However, we are 
losing this advantage if we don’t take time to develop what we say 
and consciously practice what we say.28 
Although students were promised in the ninety-minute sessions that 
the three-day seminars would teach them everything they needed to 
know about investing in real estate,29 instructors in the three-day 
seminars said that mentorship programs “would be the only way to 
 
22 Exhibits to Snell Affirmation, supra note 9, at Exhibit K17 Affidavit of Kathleen 
Meese ¶ 3. 
23 PLAYBOOK, supra note 8, at 22, 110 (emphasis in original). 
24 Order Granting Motion for Class Certification at 6, Cohen v. Trump, No. 13-cv-2519-
GPC-WVG (S.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2014), ECF No. 53. 
25 See PLAYBOOK, supra note 8, at 36. 
26 Id. at 98. 
27 See, e.g., Third Amended Class Action Complaint at 35, Makaeff v. Trump Univ., 
LLC, No. 3:10-cv-00940-GPC-WVG (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2012), ECF No. 128 (quoting 
consumer complaint: “What a SCAM[.] I attended the three day seminar and really learned 
very, very little. [Their] goal is to talk you into joining the next seminar, which can cost up 
to 35,000. They use almost Gestapo tactics to sign for this seminar . . . . Any questions you 
ask are never answered.”). 
28 PLAYBOOK, supra note 8, at 99. 
29 See Third Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 27, at 35 (quoting consumer 
complaint: “I was told that after taking the first 3 day seminar, which cost $1,500 I could go 
out start making deals . . . . The only thing they want you to do is sign up for the next seminar 
which can cost up to $35,000.”). 
PETERSON (DO NOT DELETE) 12/14/2017  8:05 PM 
2017] Trump University and Presidential Impeachment 63 
succeed in real estate investment.”30 Like the ninety-minute sales pitch 
before the three-day seminars, “teachers” were hired as independent 
contractors and exclusively paid based on commissions.31 At Trump 
University, no one was ever paid to actually teach the students.32 
Instead, sales staff, posing as teachers, were trained to manipulate 
students’ emotions in order to sell expensive “Trump Elite” packages. 
For example, the Trump University Playbook explains, “[t]he words ‘I 
noticed’ have a powerful subconscious effect on people because they 
send a subliminal message to them that they stood out in the crowd, 
that they are attractive or charismatic or that they impressed you. It 
sends a message to the person that you have interest in them. People 
love recognition and attention.”33 These manipulative sales tactics 
were carefully refined and iterated.34 Indeed, to avoid actual teaching, 
the sales team was instructed to pay “special attention” to avoid “needy 
attendees” asking questions during breaks that would prevent speakers 
from making more effective one-on-one sales pitches to the most likely 
buyers.35 Instead, Trump University trained staff to identify the 
emotional vulnerabilities of students and exploit those vulnerabilities 
to sell additional Trump University packages. As the Trump University 
Playbook explained, “[y]ou don’t sell products, benefits or solutions—
you sell feelings . . . [because] a sole focus on products leads to 
objections.”36 Trump University trained staff to use the three-day 
seminars to pretend to care about their students in order to establish the 
trust necessary to close each sale: “[T]he critical factor is trust. You 
have three days to build a relationship where a student accepts you will 
always keep their best interests at heart.”37 
Trump University established this trust in order to take as much 
money as possible from each of its students. Beginning at registration, 
 
30 Exhibits to Snell Affirmation, supra note 9, at Exhibit K14 Affidavit of June Harris ¶ 
9. 
31 Verified Petition ¶ 92, New York v. The Trump Entrepreneur Initiative LLC, No. 
451463/2013 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 24, 2013), NYSCEF No. 1. 
32 Declaration of Corinne Sommer in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification 
¶ 10, Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, No. 3:10-cv-00940-CAB-WVG (S.D. Cal., Sept. 22, 
2014), ECF No. 48-13 (Sommer is the former Trump University Manager of the Events 
Department.). 
33 PLAYBOOK, supra note 8, at 100. 
34 Id. at 99–100 (“We also have the advantage of testing the question out on hundreds of 
people and adjusting it to increase our chances for a desirable response. The attendee does 
not have the luxury of ‘practicing’ his or her answer.”). 
35 Id. at 37, 39. 
36 Id. at 100. 
37 Id. at 99. 
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Trump University staff would take photographs of every student.38 The 
purpose of the photograph was to design one-on-one sales portfolios of 
each student that would allow staff to make more effective sales 
pitches.39 Using the justification of providing personal financial 
advice, Trump University would also extract detailed financial 
information from each student.40 The real purpose of obtaining this 
information was to discover the student’s liquidity so instructors could 
more effectively sell expensive Trump Elite “Bronze,” “Silver,” and 
“Gold” packages that cost $8995, $19,495, and $34,995 respectively.41 
The Trump University Playbook explained that during the first evening 
of each three-day seminar, 
[T]he team should go through each profile and determine who has the 
most and least liquid assets and rank them using the following scale: 
E1 – Over $35,000 of liquid assets 
E2 – Between $20,000 and $30,000 of liquid assets 
E3 – Under $10,000 of liquid assets 
E4 – Less than $2,000 of liquid assets.42 
Ranking students from top to bottom by assets allowed sales staff to 
target the consumer with the most expensive package for which each 
consumer could possibly pay.43 
An important part of the three-day seminar was convincing students 
to call their credit card companies to increase their credit limits.44 
Instructors characterized this part of the training as a way to increase 
the students’ ability to obtain funds to purchase real estate.45 However, 
the real purpose was to ensure that students would have enough 
 
38 Id. at 32. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 36. 
41 See id. at 9–10. 
42 Id. at 36. 
43 Id. at 129 (“When you introduce the price, don’t make it sound like you think it’s a lot 
of money, if you don’t make a big deal out of it they won’t. If they can afford the gold elite 
don’t allow them to think about doing anything besides the gold elite.”). 
44 See, e.g., Exhibits to Snell Affirmation, supra note 9, at Exhibit K15 Affidavit of 
Robert Jones ¶ 8. 
45 Id. (“During the three-day seminar, there was very strong pressure to sign up for one 
of Trump’s mentorship programs. Towards the end of the course, the speakers told us to 
increase our credit limits so that we could use our credit cards to pay for the advanced Trump 
Elite course.”). 
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liquidity to purchase Trump Elite mentorship packages by the end of 
the seminar.46 As a former student, Wilma Fisher, explained, 
[T]he Trump speakers encouraged us to call our credit card 
companies to request that our credit limits be increased. The Trump 
speakers said that we would need the extra capital for real estate 
investment, but in reality they just wanted us to have more money 
available for extremely expensive mentorship programs. Those who 
were successful in having their credit card limits increased were 
celebrated and cheered by the Trump staff like they had just been 
induced into a fraternity.47 
Ms. Fisher’s explanation is corroborated by the Trump University 
Playbook which trained employees to sell mentoring programs to 
students, no matter how dire their financial situation.48 Trump 
University relied on sales scripts to train Trump University staff to 
ignore and overcome students’ resistance to maxing out their credit 
cards to pay for more Trump University services.49 For example, the 
Trump University Playbook gave the following model dialogue: 
OBJECTION: I DON’T LIKE USING MY CREDIT CARDS AND 
GOING INTO DEBT –OR– I JUST PAID MY CREDIT CARDS 
OFF 
[Answer:] I see, do you like living paycheck to paycheck? Do you 
like just getting by in life? Do you enjoy seeing everyone else but 
yourself in their dream houses and driving their dream cars with huge 
checking accounts? Those people saw an opportunity, and didn’t 
make excuses, like what you’re doing now. Most wealthy people 
made their money in real estate and it usually started with a decision 
to get the knowledge and skills to be successful. You need to look at 
what this small investment will fix in your life. You can stop living 
paycheck to paycheck, build your retirement account and pay cash 
for your dream car. You’re here today because you’re sick and tired 
of being sick and tired and you want to change that—you’re not 
alone. I’m going to help you take your first step to create the life 
you’ve dreamed of. Follow me and let’s get you enrolled. 
Congratulations!50 
According to the Trump University Playbook: “Money is never a 
reason for not enrolling in Trump University; if they really believe in 
 
46 Declaration of Ronald Schnackenberg in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Class 
Certification ¶ 4, Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 3:10-cv-00940-CAB-WVG (S.D. Cal. 
Sept. 22, 2014), ECF No. 48-9; Declaration of Corinne Sommer, supra note 32, ¶ 8. 
47 Exhibits to Snell Affirmation, supra note 9, at Exhibit K9 Affidavit of Wilma Fisher ¶ 
6. 
48 PLAYBOOK, supra note 8, at 99. 
49 Id. at 112–13. 
50 Id. 
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you and your product, they will find the money. You are not doing any 
favors by letting someone use lack of money as an excuse.”51 To this 
end, Trump University sales staff pressured families to mortgage their 
homes and cash out their retirement funds to purchase Trump Elite 
packages.52 At the heart of every closing one-on-one sales pitch were 
sales scripts that promised “every single resource Mr. Trump has at his 
disposal” and “most importantly a hand-selected, Trump-certified, 
multi-millionaire mentor.”53 These appeals to Trump’s judgment and 
expertise were effective in convincing thousands of consumers to 
purchase Trump Elite mentoring packages that cost, in some cases, 
more than the entire annual salary of typical employees at one of 
Trump’s now-bankrupt casinos.54 
B. “Phantom Mentors” 
After the excitement of the high-intensity sales pitches wore off, 
many customers became upset, demanded refunds, and submitted 
complaints to the Better Business Bureau (BBB), state attorneys 
general, and the Federal Trade Commission.55 Customers complained 
that Trump University newspaper advertisements, direct mail letters, 
and the ninety-minute sales pitches for the three-day seminars were 
false or misleading. In one typical example, a consumer complained to 
the New York State Education Department: 
I responded to a free workshop from Donald Trump University. At 
the workshop, they sold me on taking the next step to further my real 
estate education. At the weekend seminar I went to ($995) all they 
did was try to sell me the next package for $35K. I paid $995 and a 
weekend of my life to hear a long pitch.56 
 
51 Id. at 99. 
52  Exhibits to Snell Affirmation, supra note 9, at Exhibit K13 Affidavit of Nora Hanna 
¶ 11. 
53 PLAYBOOK, supra note 8, at 129. 
54 Blackjack Dealer Salaries in Atlantic City, New Jersey, SALARY.COM, http://www1 
.salary.com/NJ/Atlantic-City/Blackjack-Dealer-salary.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2016) 
(reporting a median annual Blackjack Dealer salary in Atlantic City, New Jersey, of 
$17,259, as of August 29, 2016); see also Russ Buettner & Charles V. Bagli, How Trump 
Profited on Failed Casinos, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2016, at A1. 
55 See, e.g., Matt Novak, These Former “Students” Say Trump University Was a Scam, 
GIZMODO (Aug. 25, 2015, 1:20 PM), http://gizmodo.com/these-former-students-say-trump 
-university-was-a-scam-1726235122 (quoting from Federal Trade Commission Complaints 
obtained through Freedom of Information Act request). 
56 Exhibits to Snell Affirmation, supra note 9, at Exhibit L36 Complaint of Daniel Rivera 
000334. 
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Former Trump University students complained so frequently that the 
BBB eventually lowered the Trump University’s rating.57 The BBB 
explained: “During the period when Trump University appeared to be 
active in the marketplace, BBB received multiple customer complaints 
about this business. These complaints affected the Trump University 
BBB rating, which was as low as D- in 2010.”58 
While complaints about Trump University three-day seminars were 
common, it was the students that purchased costly mentoring packages 
that suffered most. Despite paying as much as $35,000, consumer 
complaints against Trump University reveal that many purchasers of 
Trump Elite mentoring packages did not receive meaningful real estate 
mentoring.59 Consumers complained that Trump University’s Trump 
Elite mentors, 
• did not return phone calls; 
• set up voicemail inboxes that did not accept messages; 
• were inexperienced or could not provide useful advice; 
• advised students to engage in illegal practices; 
• blamed students for their inability to make money; 
• frequently delayed or refused to provide refunds despite promised 
“guarantees.”60 
Many Trump University students lost their life savings or were 
forced into bankruptcy by  their expenditures on the Trump 
University’s “phantom mentors.”61 Trump University students 
themselves paint a troubling picture of broken promises and neglect. 
For example, Trump University took thousands of dollars from a 
 
57 Statement by Better Business Bureau Servicing Metropolitan New York and Council 





59 See, e.g., Novak, supra note 55 (quoting student complaint to the FTC stating, “The 
program as a whole—and especially the mentoring—has been an absolute, utter waste and 
completely failed to live up to its promises.”). 
60 Request for Approval to File Original Petition and Application for Permanent 
Injunction, Texas v. Trump Univ. LLC, No. AG 093157089 (Tex. Consumer Prot. & Pub. 
Health Div. May 6, 2010); Exhibits to Snell Affirmation, supra note 9, at Exhibit K6 
Affidavit of Nelly Cunningham ¶ 9; Novak, supra note 55; see also PLAYBOOK, supra note 
8, at 114 (“Mr. Trump won’t listen to excuses and neither will we. Excuses will never make 
you more money; they will just continue to cost you more missed opportunities in life.”). 
61 Exhibits to Snell Affirmation, supra note 9, at Exhibit L32 Louis Piatt Complaint 
000315. 
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divorced, unemployed woman from Seattle, Washington, who was 
suffering from multiple sclerosis and a stroke.62 Even though she had 
no experience in real estate, instructors encouraged her to max out her 
credit cards to invest in more classes.63 When she filed a complaint 
with the Federal Trade Commission, she wrote, “I wanted to depend on 
me, not my government . . . . I don’t understand how they can take my 
money and not help me . . . .”64 
Some Trump University customers were outraged with their 
treatment. For example, one customer explained, 
Trump University and their staff should be ashamed of themselves! 
They RUINED my credit!!! They told me I would get my large 
investment back in my first real estate deal because I would have 
access to amazing mentors and course content. I did what they told 
me in all of the courses and it was nonsense! I maxed out my credit 
cards because I thought Donald Trump wouldn’t have such a sorry 
excuse for a school just to make more money. But he is a greedy man 
so I should have known. Be aware that when they tell you to increase 
your credit limit to purchase real estate it’s really to scam you out of 
tons of money that you’ve worked so hard for.65 
Still another customer from New York explained, 
My entire “mentorship” with [my Trump University mentor] 
consisted of three telephone conversations . . . . I wasted my entire 
life savings on Trump. I spent $1,495 on the Trump three-day 
seminar and $24,995 on the Trump Gold Elite mentorship package, 
only to be demeaned and belittled. I feel like such a fool. Trump did 
not help me with my real estate investment questions. Nor did I learn 
anything of application to other real estate transactions. My finances 
deteriorated significantly and I was left insolvent by Trump 
University.66 
Many complaints suggest that Trump University particularly 
targeted older Americans. For example, the adult child of one consumer 
complained, 
This is the biggest SCAM I’ve ever seen! My 82 year old father went 
to a free seminar promising to make him rich through real estate. The 
seminar was solely for the purpose of upselling him into attending a 
$1500 three day workshop by promising him they would teach him 
 




65 Third Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 27, at 37–38 (quoting Trump 
University customer complaint). 
66 Exhibits to Snell Affirmation, supra note 9, at Exhibit K6 Affidavit of Nelly 
Cunningham ¶¶ 8, 11–12. 
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how to buy and sell foreclosures for huge profits . . . [H]e goes to the 
3 day workshop and when he comes home we find out that they 
pressured him into spending $35k MORE! . . . Then he proceeds to 
tell us how the majority of people there were SENIORS like him! 
These aren’t long term investors here, these are people being tricked 
into thinking they can make a quick profit! If this isn’t the definition 
of preying on the elderly then I don’t know what is.67 
Another student explained to a Trump University instructor that she 
could not afford to purchase the Trump Elite Gold mentoring package 
because she needed her resources to care for her child with Down’s 
Syndrome.68 The Trump University instructor persuaded the mother to 
buy the Trump Elite Gold mentoring package, guaranteeing that she 
would make back her $25,000 in sixty days.69 The instructor promised 
her that he would be her personal mentor, that she could make 
unlimited calls to him for life, and that she would receive valuable real 
estate leads, legal forms, and lifetime access to Trump University 
webinars.70 But, after the mother agreed to buy the mentoring package, 
Trump University substituted a different mentor who blamed her for 
being unprepared and did not provide any useful advice.71 Eventually 
all the phone numbers she received were disconnected and none of the 
real estate leads, legal forms, or lifetime access to webinars were 
provided.72 Despite asking for a refund, she explained, 
I was unable to get my refund and am still paying off my debts from 
my Trump tuition. Donald Trump received $25,000 of my money. 
For my $25,000, I have a lifetime membership to nothing! No one 
contacted me and I have not been able to contact anyone because the 
phone numbers have all been disconnected. There is no Trump 
University.73 
Far from unusual, consumers filed complaints like these with the 
BBB, law enforcement offices in at least eleven states, the Federal 
Trade Commission, and the U.S. Department of Justice.74 
These consumer complaints were further corroborated by sworn 
statements of former Trump University employees. For example, 
 
67 Third Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 27, at 37. 
68 Exhibits to Snell Affirmation, supra note 9, at Exhibit K17 Affidavit of Kathleen 
Meese ¶¶ 8–9. 
69 Id. ¶¶ 13, 20. 
70 Id. ¶¶ 8, 13, 19. 
71 Id. ¶ 14. 
72 Id. ¶ 20. 
73 Id. 
74 Complaint ¶ 50, Cohen v. Trump, No. 3:13-cv-02519-DMS-RBB (S.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 
2013), ECF No. 1. 
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former Trump University Sales Executive, Jason Nichols, explained, 
“salespeople, including me, uniformly told consumers, from the script, 
that: ‘Instructors will be holding your hand, showing you the way.’ This 
was not true. The instructors and mentors ignored students and stopped 
returning calls shortly after they were paid.”75 Corinne Sommer, 
former manager of the events department that coordinated Trump 
University training seminars, concurred. 
Because of the pay structure, mentors had no incentive to call 
consumers back or work with them once the consumer signed up and 
the mentor was paid. The focus of the mentors seemed to be on 
getting new sales and new commissions. As a result, I recall that 
mentors rarely returned phone calls from students or spent much time 
talking with them. I received calls from many angry students telling 
me that they had been trying to reach their mentor to no avail.76 
Similarly, Ronald Schnackenberg, a former sales manager for 
Trump University, testified, 
[A]t a live event in New York City in April 2007, I spoke to a couple 
. . . . After the hard-sell sales presentation, they were considering 
purchasing the $35,000 Elite program. I did not feel it was an 
appropriate program for them because of their precarious financial 
condition—they had no money to pay for the program, but would 
have had to pay for the program using his disability income and 
taking out a loan based upon equity in his apartment. Trump 
University reprimanded me for not trying harder to sell the program 
to this couple. Another sales person . . . talked them into buying the 
$35,000 seminar after I refused to sell this program to them. I was 
disgusted by this conduct and decided to resign.77 
Schnackenberg summed up his work at Trump University this way: 
“Based on my personal experience and employment, I believe that 
Trump University was a fraudulent scheme, and that it preyed on the 
elderly and uneducated to separate them from their money.”78 
II 
FRAUD, RACKETEERING, AND TRUMP UNIVERSITY 
When officials in President Trump’s home state of New York 
inevitably began looking into consumer complaints, they quickly 
 
75 Declaration of Jason Nicholas in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification 
¶ 15, Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, No. 3:10-cv-00940-CAB-WVG (S.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 
2014), ECF No. 48-9. 
76 Declaration of Corinne Sommer, supra note 32, ¶ 10. 
77 Declaration of Ronald Schnackenberg, supra note 46, ¶ 4. 
78 Id. ¶ 15. 
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discovered that Trump University did not meet even the most basic 
labeling and licensing requirements of the state.79 In many jurisdictions 
it is common for the names of certain business types to be reserved for 
only those businesses that meet specific legal criteria.80 For example, a 
barber shop is not legally entitled to call itself a bank. In New York, 
the state legislature adopted laws that restrict the use of the word 
“University” to only those institutions that are either designated by the 
New York Board of Regents or have a private university charter from 
the legislature.81 President Trump unambiguously violated New York 
law by naming a “university” after himself. 
In addition to its illegal name, New York law provides that “[n]o 
private school which charges tuition or fees related to instruction . . . 
shall be operated by any person . . . for the purpose of teaching or giving 
instruction in any subject or subjects, unless it is licensed by the 
[D]epartment [of Education].”82 The purpose of this law is to allow the 
state Department of Education to monitor teaching quality and protect 
vulnerable students.83 President Trump never bothered to obtain a 
license and illegally used independent contractors for solicitation, hired 
unlicensed teachers and an unlicensed school director—all of which 
were obvious violations of New York Law.84 When New York officials 
wrote to President Trump, explaining how he was operating an 
illegally-named and unlicensed for-profit school, he refused to change 
the name and simply ignored authorities for nearly five years.85 After 
 
79 New York v. Trump Entrepreneur Initiative LLC, 26 N.Y.S.3d 66, 67 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2016). 
80 See, e.g., Le Drugstore Etats Unis, Inc. v. N.Y. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 307 N.E.2d 
249, 252 (N.Y. 1973) (holding retailer could not conduct business under the name “Le 
Drugstore” without being licensed as a pharmacy); Kilpatrick v. State Bd. of Registration 
for Prof’l Eng’rs, 610 S.W.2d 867, 871 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (prohibiting use of the word 
“engineering” in a corporate name where the business was not legally qualified to engage in 
the practice of engineering). 
81 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 224(1)(a) (McKinney 1991) (“No individual . . . not holding 
university, college or other degree conferring powers by special charter from the legislature 
. . .  shall . . . use, advertise or transact business under the name university . . . unless the 
right to do so shall have been granted by the regents . . . .”). 
82 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 5001(1) (McKinney 2016). 
83 Licenses And Permits–Private Schools–Vocational  Education, 2012 N.Y LAWS 1088 
(“Legislative intent. The legislature hereby finds and declares that there is a growing need 
to protect students enrolled in certain non-degree granting proprietary schools from 
inadequate job training and school closure, which disrupts the academic progress of these 
students and jeopardizes their tuition funds.”). 
84 See N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 5001–5010 (McKinney 2016). 
85 New York v. Trump Entrepreneur Initiative LLC, 26 N.Y.S.3d 66, 67 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2016) (“By letter dated May 27, 2005, the New York State Department of Education (SED) 
notified Donald Trump individually, Sexton, and Trump University that they were violating 
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exercising considerable patience, the New York Attorney General 
eventually sued to enforce state law.86 
A. State of New York v. The Trump Entrepreneur Initiative, LLC 
f/k/a/ Trump University 
While the New York Attorney General’s complaint included counts 
of licensing and labeling violations, it was the first, and most 
prominently featured, count that captured the headlines in August of 
2013—Fraud.87 The New York Court of Appeals explained, “[t]he 
elements of a cause of action for fraud require [1] a material 
misrepresentation of a fact, [2] knowledge of its falsity, [3] an intent to 
induce reliance, [4] justifiable reliance by the plaintiff and [5] 
damages.”88 Fraud is both a crime and a civil tort. In most states, the 
attorney general has the discretion to attack fraud either by charging 
the fraudster with a crime or suing civilly.89 Both approaches have 
benefits and drawbacks. Prosecuting fraud as a crime requires proof 
“beyond a reasonable doubt,” while a civil case generally only requires 
proof by a “preponderance of the evidence”—a lower burden of 
proof.90 Moreover, successfully prosecuting fraud as a crime can 
 
the New York Education Law by using the word ‘University’ when it was not actually 
chartered as one.”). 
86 Press Release, N.Y. Attorney Gen. Office, A.G. Schneiderman Sues Donald Trump, 
Trump Univ. & Michael Sexton for Defrauding Consumers out of $40 Million With Sham 
“University” (Aug. 25, 2013), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-sues           -
donald-trump-trump-university-michael-sexton-defrauding-consumers [hereinafter 
Schneiderman Press Release]. 
87 Michael Gormley, N.Y. AG Sues Trump, ‘Trump University,’ Claims Fraud, USA 
TODAY (Aug. 26, 2013, 7:09 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business /2013 
/08/24/trump-university-fraud-ny/2696367/. 
88 Eurycleia Partners, LP v. Seward & Kissel, LLP, 12 N.Y.3d 553, 559 (N.Y. 2009). 
89 See, e.g., TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 402.0231 (2003) (establishing a “corporate 
integrity unit” in the Texas Attorney General’s office to assist in both the prosecution and 
civil administrative enforcement of corporate fraud); 71 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 732-204(d), 205(a) (West 2017) (establishing the Pennsylvania Attorney General’s 
jurisdiction over civil consumer affairs violations and criminal prosecutions). 
90 Compare 1 WHARTON’S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 2:3 (15th ed. 1997) (“[I]n a criminal 
case, the prosecution has the burden of production and the burden of persuasion on the 
question of guilt and the standard of proof is ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’”) with 10 
AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 32:105 (2012) (for civil fraud claims in most states “proof by 
a mere preponderance of the evidence is held to be sufficient”). In some states, the standard 
of proof for civil tort claims departs from the normal civil preponderance of the evidence 
standard by requiring an intermediate “clear and convincing” burden of proof. 10 
AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 32:105 (2012); see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 
(1970) (In criminal cases, “the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction 
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sometimes leave the incarcerated defendant without resources to 
actually repay victims and can also take much longer to bring the 
defendant to trial.91 Even in civil fraud cases, courts routinely dismiss 
fraud allegations if the accusations are conclusory or do not point to 
particular facts or circumstances justifying the case.92 To survive a 
motion to dismiss, “averments of fraud must be accompanied by the 
‘who, what, when, where, and how’” of the misconduct charged.93 
In the state of New York’s case against President Trump, the top law 
enforcement officer of New York accused Trump University of making 
the following material misrepresentations in its marketing: 
• consumers would learn “everything [they] need[ed] to know” to 
become successful real estate investors; 
• consumers would quickly recoup their investment by doing real 
estate deals, with some instructors claiming that consumers would 
earn tens of thousands of dollars within thirty days; 
• instructors were “handpicked” by Donald Trump; 
• consumers would be taught Donald Trump’s very own real estate 
strategies and techniques; 
• consumers would receive access to private sources of financing 
(“hard money lenders”); and 
• the three-day seminar would include a year-long “Apprenticeship 
Support” program.94 
Although President Trump and Trump University aggressively 
litigated the New York Attorney General’s case for over three years, 
they failed to obtain a dismissal of New York’s fraud accusations and 
 
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime 
with which he is charged.”). 
91 See Daniel Faichney, Comment, Autocorrect? A Proposal to Encourage Voluntary 
Restitution Through the White-Collar Sentencing Calculus, 104 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 389, 413 (2014) (explaining that “[b]etween 2000 and 2002, [federal] 
criminal debt collection rates stood around 4%,” and “offenders expecting prosecution or 
conviction . . . have considerable incentives to hoard, hide, or perhaps rapidly spend the 
funds they obtained before losing access to them upon conviction.”); see also U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-80, CRIMINAL DEBT: COURT-ORDERED RESTITUTION 
AMOUNTS FAR EXCEED LIKELY COLLECTIONS FOR THE CRIME VICTIMS IN SELECTED 
FINANCIAL FRAUD CASES 11–12 (2005), http://www.gao.gov/assets/250/2452 27.pdf (“a 
major problem hindering” restitution collection is “the long time intervals between the 
criminal offense and the judgment.”). 
92 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 444 (2017). 
93 Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant Donald Trump’s Motion to 
Dismiss at *4, Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, No. 3:10-cv-0940-IEG-WVG (S.D. Cal. May 
16, 2011). 
94 Schneiderman Press Release, supra note 86. 
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lost his counter claims.95 President Trump’s initial litigation strategy 
was to seek dismissal of the case because the claims were too old, 96 
because there were fine print disclosures that disclaimed any 
responsibility for false representations,97 and to argue that President 
Trump himself could not be held accountable for the alleged fraud and 
violations committed by Trump University.98 President Trump also 
filed a countersuit claiming that the New York Attorney General’s 
office was harassing him with a malicious prosecution and asked for 
$100 million in damages.99 While some of the alleged illegal activity 
occurred before the applicable statute of limitations, much of it—
including the alleged fraud—did not.100 The trial judge dismissed 
President Trump’s malicious prosecution counterclaim as premature 
and baseless.101 The court also refused to resolve the case through 
summary judgment.102 Following President Trump’s unsuccessful 
appeal, which allowed the Attorney General’s fraud claim to proceed, 
the 2016 presidential election occurred while the parties were 
attempting to resolve several discovery disputes.103 
B. Low v. Trump University, LLC and Cohen v. Trump University, 
LLC 
Private litigants first sued President Trump and Trump University in 
2010.104 The initial complaint listed over ten different violations of 
consumer protection laws, including the violation of California’s 
Unfair Competition Law, false advertising, breach of contract, and 
 
95 New York v. Trump Entrepreneur Initiative LLC, 26 N.Y.S.3d 66, 67 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2016). 
96  Trump Respondents’ Affirmation in Support of Motion to Dismiss ¶ 4, New York v. 
Trump Entrepreneur Initiative LLC, No. 451463/2013 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 31, 2013), 
NYSCEF No. 21. 
97 Id. ¶ 27. 
98 Id. ¶¶ 175–77. 
99 Trump Respondents’ Verified Answer with Counterclaim to the Petition at 70, New 
York v. Trump Entrepreneur Initiative LLC, No. 451463/2013 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 3, 2014), 
NYSCEF No. 61. 
100 New York v. Trump Entrepreneur Initiative LLC, 26 N.Y.S.3d 66, 73 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2016). 
101 New York v. Trump Entrepreneur Initiative LLC, No. 451463/2013, 2014 slip op. 
32685 at *14–15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 8, 2014). 
102 Id. President Trump did succeed in eliminating the N.Y. Attorney General’s claim for 
violations of the Federal Trade Commission’s three-day rescission notice rule on the 
grounds that the illegal activity occurred more than three years prior to filing. Id. 
103 Trump Entrepreneur Initiative LLC, 26 N.Y.S.3d at 73. 
104 See generally Class Action Complaint, Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, No. 3:10-cv-
00940-GPC-WVG (S.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2010), ECF No. 1. 
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fraud.105 The parties aggressively litigated Low v. Trump for over six 
years.106 
Similar to the New York litigation, President Trump’s early efforts 
to fight the case included filing a countersuit accusing a former student 
of defamation.107 President Trump’s counterclaims spawned extensive 
litigation, which proceeded alongside the original case.108 President 
Trump claimed that the named plaintiff in the putative class action 
against him was defaming him because she initially gave Trump 
University a favorable student evaluation.109 On appeal, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit explained, 
Trump University . . . argues that Makaeff’s early testimonials 
praising Trump University indirectly prove that she acted with a high 
degree of awareness of the probable falsity of her later statements. 
However, it is plausible that Makaeff sincerely believed in Trump 
University’s offerings when she submitted her written and 
videotaped testimonials. The gist of Makaeff’s complaint about 
Trump University is that it constitutes an elaborate scam. As the 
recent Ponzi-scheme scandals involving one-time financial 
luminaries like Bernard Madoff and Allen Stanford demonstrate, 
victims of con artists often sing the praises of their victimizers until 
the moment they realize they have been fleeced.110 
Eventually, the district court struck President Trump’s defamation 
counterclaim and awarded attorney fees and costs to the student that 
President Trump sued.111 The attorneys for the student expended 
nearly three-quarters of a million dollars in defending against President 
 
105 Id. ¶ 5; see also Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant’s Motion to 
Dismiss at *1, Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, No. 3:10-cv-940-IEG-WVG, 2010 WL 
3988684 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2010). The plaintiffs later amended their complaint to add 
claims relating to Florida residents. Third Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 27, 
at 78–80. Tarla Maekeff, the original class representative in the private Trump University 
litigation, eventually asked to drop out of the case because she “want[ed] her life back 
without living in fear of being disparaged by Trump on national television.” See Chris 
Isidore, Woman Who Sued Trump University Wants Out of Case, CNNMONEY (Mar. 11, 
2016, 11:40 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/03/11/news/companies/trump-university -
donald-trump-tarla-makaeff/index.html. 
106 See Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra 
note 105. 
107 See Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 715 F.3d 254, 258 (9th Cir. 2013). 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 271. 
111 Order Granting Plaintiff/Counterdefendant’s Special Motion to Strike 
Defendant/Counterclaimant’s Defamation Counterclaim at 1014, Makaeff v. Trump Univ., 
LLC, 26 F. Supp. 3d 1002 (S.D. Cal. 2014). 
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Trump’s defamation claim—all of which President Trump and Trump 
University were ordered to repay.112 
President Trump’s other efforts to extinguish the case also failed. 
Among the three most important milestones in the six year saga were: 
(1) the district court’s order preserving most of the consumers’ counts 
over President Trump’s motion to dismiss;113 (2) the certification of a 
class action for all consumers that purchased a Trump University three-
day seminar or Elite program in California, New York, and Florida;114 
and (3) the denial of President Trump’s motion for summary judgment 
on a variety of state consumer protection claims that included statutory 
fraud counts, such as California’s financial abuse of the elderly statute 
and Florida’s misleading advertising law.115 
Unlike many private consumer protection lawsuits, which often 
gradually lose steam, the Trump University claims gathered 
momentum as plaintiffs amassed additional evidence and prevailed on 
various motions.116 Most notably, in 2013, the consumers’ counsel in 
the Low litigation filed a second, related lawsuit called Cohen v. 
Trump.117 The Cohen case pleaded a single claim: racketeering.118 The 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) is a 
 
112 Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiff/Counter Defendant Tarla 
Makaeff’s Request for Fees and Costs at *1, Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, No. 3:10-cv-
0940-GPC-WVG (S.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2015) (“The Court AWARDS Makaeff fees in the 
amount of $790,083.40, and costs in the amount of $8,695.81.”). 
113 Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra 
note 105, at *8–9. 
114 Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiff’s Motion to Certify Class Action, 
Appoint Class Representatives, and Appoint Class Counsel at *20, Makaeff v. Trump Univ., 
LLC, No. 3:10-cv-0940-GPC-WVG (S.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2014). 
115 Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant Donald J. Trump’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Partial Summary Judgment at 980, Makaeff v. 
Trump Univ., LLC, 145 F. Supp. 3d 962 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2015) (“Financial abuse of an 
elder occurs when a defendant ‘[t]akes, secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains real or 
personal property of an elder . . . for a wrongful use or with intent to defraud . . . .’”). 
Although the plaintiff stipulated to dismissal of the common law fraud claim in Low v. 
Trump, multiple remaining statutory counts require proof of the common law elements of 
fraud. See id. at 981 (Under the Florida Misleading Advertising Law, the plaintiff must 
“prove reliance on the alleged misleading advertising, as well as each of the other elements 
of the common law tort of fraud in the inducement.”). 
116 See, e.g., Order Denying Defendants’ Motion for Leave to File Renewed Motion for 
Decertification at 4, Low v. Trump University, LLC. No. 3:10-cv-0940-GPC-WVG (S.D. 
Cal Aug. 29, 2016), ECF No. 506 (rejecting President Trump’s arguments that students were 
not uniformly exposed to the alleged “core” misrepresentations and that individual issues of 
reliance, causation, and materiality predominated). 
117 See Cohen v. Trump, 200 F. Supp. 3d 1063, 1067 (S.D. Cal. 2016). 
118 Id. 
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federal statute that provides criminal penalties and a private, civil right 
of action to stop corrupt organizations from engaging in a pattern of 
illegal activity.119 Although organized crime families figured 
prominently in the legislative history of the RICO statute, Congress 
adopted language applicable to any corrupt organization that uses a 
pattern of specifically enumerated crimes.120 According to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, a RICO plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) conduct (2) of 
an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.”121 
A pattern of racketeering activity is defined as at least two instances 
of any crime on a statutory list that includes murder, kidnapping, as 
well as mail fraud and wire fraud.122 The federal crimes of mail fraud 
and wire fraud require a plaintiff to demonstrate two elements: “(1) 
having devised or intending to devise a scheme to defraud (or to 
perform specified fraudulent acts), and (2) use of the mail [or wires] 
for the purpose of executing, or attempting to execute, the scheme (or 
specified fraudulent acts).”123 To show a scheme to defraud, plaintiffs 
must generally present the same type of evidence of fraud normally at 
issue in any common law tort claim or state criminal prosecution.124 
Importantly, plaintiffs’ evidence must show deceit “coupled with a 
contemplated harm to the victim.”125 Nevertheless, “[t]he requisite 
intent under the federal mail and wire fraud statutes may be inferred 
from the totality of the circumstances and need not be proven by direct 
evidence.”126 Prosecutors and civil plaintiffs alike can argue that a 
defendant’s intent may be inferred “from statements and conduct,”127 
as well as “from the modus operandi of the scheme.”128 The intent to 
defraud can be established “if a representation is made with reckless 
 
119 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963, 1964(c) (2016). 
120 S. REP. NO. 91–617, at 79 (1969). 
121 Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. IMREX Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985). 
122 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(1), (5) (2016). 
123 Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 721 (1989). 
124 See 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 24 (2017) (listing traditional elements of 
fraud). Under RICO, “the Government may bring either civil or criminal RICO actions, or 
both, against a defendant for the same or overlapping unlawful conduct.” U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, CIVIL RICO: A MANUAL FOR FEDERAL ATTORNEYS 309 (2007), https://www 
.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal/legacy/2010/11/12/2007civil-rico.pdf. 
125 United States v. D’Amato, 39 F.3d 1249, 1257 (2d Cir. 1994) (providing an example 
of legally insufficient evidence of intent). 
126 United States v. Alston, 609 F.2d 531, 538 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
127 United States v. Cusino, 694 F.2d 185, 187 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing United States v. 
Beecroft, 608 F.2d 753, 757 (9th Cir. 1979)). 
128 United States v. Reid, 533 F.2d 1255, 1264 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
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indifference to its truth or falsity,” including the use of “extravagant 
claims.”129 
Only months before the 2016 presidential election, a United States 
federal district judge held that the plaintiffs in Cohen v. Trump raised a 
triable issue of racketeering based on multiple predicate acts of mail 
and wire fraud.130 Judge Gonzalo Curiel held that President Trump was 
not entitled to summary judgment on his argument that he did not 
engage in “conduct” within the meaning of RICO.131 The Judge 
pointed to President Trump’s own deposition testimony indicating that 
he had approved the allegedly fraudulent marketing materials.132 
Moreover, unlike some RICO cases where the alleged enterprise is 
informal, President Trump was the founder and majority owner of a 
limited liability company that, in turn, employed a variety of 
independent contractors—easily satisfying RICO’s enterprise 
definition.133 With thousands of allegedly false statements made to 
consumers in cities all across the country through a variety of print, 
online, and direct mail representations, the plaintiffs in Cohen could 
have shown a pattern of more than two misrepresentations without 
difficulty. Perhaps most importantly, Judge Curiel held that this 
evidence raised triable issues of materiality and intent to deceive.134 
Moreover, liability for racketeering in the case was not limited to 
Trump University; Judge Curiel specifically held that President Trump 
himself was subject to a trial for racketeering in his individual 
capacity.135 
President Trump controversially responded by accusing Judge 
Curiel of bias due to his Mexican American heritage.136 But, in both 
the litigation and in his electoral campaign, President Trump’s 
foremost talking point was his claim that ninety-eight percent of Trump 
University students were satisfied.137 However, Trump University did 
 
129 Cusino, 694 F.2d at 187. 
130 Cohen v. Trump, 200 F. Supp. 3d 1063, 1075 (S.D. Cal. 2016). 
131 Id. at 1072. 
132 Id. 
133 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2016) (“‘enterprise’ includes any individual, partnership, 
corporation, association, or other legal entity . . . .”). 
134 Cohen, 200 F. Supp. 3d at 1072–75. 
135 Id. at 1075. 
136 Alan Rappeport, Judge Faulted by Tramp Has Faced a Lot Worse, N.Y. TIMES, June 
4, 2016, at A12. 
137 Trump Respondents’ Affirmation in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 96, ¶ 
19; You’ve Heard the Rhetoric, Now Learn the Truth, 98 PERCENT APPROVAL, 
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not use reliable methods for evaluating instruction. Traditional 
universities use standard, widely accepted procedures such as proctors 
or online survey methods to prevent faculty from pressuring students 
or even surreptitiously discarding negative evaluations.138 These time-
tested student evaluation methods were not used at the Trump 
University wealth seminars. At Trump University, the same staff that 
were being evaluated had control over administering, collecting, and 
returning the evaluations.139 Students reported feeling pressured by 
Trump University staff to give positive reviews.140 Even though 
studies suggest students are less comfortable giving negative feedback 
in nonanonymous reviews, Trump University evaluation forms 
required students to include their names and contact information.141 
This pressure was particularly acute for Trump University students 
because the wealth seminars forced students to give nonanonymous 
evaluations of some of the same individuals who were to serve as their 
mentors in the future—forcing students to choose between candor and 
potentially offending their future mentor. Moreover, many of the most 
troubling allegations of broken promises occurred after students filled 
out evaluation forms. Court documents estimate that between twenty-
five and forty percent of paying Trump University students eventually 
 
https://web.archive.org/web/20160324132939/http://www.98percentapproval.com/ (last 
visited Oct. 15, 2017). 
138 See, e.g., SAN JOSE STATE UNIV. OFFICE OF INSTITUTIONAL RESEARCH & STUDENT 
EVALUATION REVIEW BD., INTERPRETATION GUIDE FOR STUDENT OPINION OF TEACHING 
EFFECTIVENESS (SOTE) RESULTS 11 (2011), http://www.sjsu.edu/facultyaffairs/docs 
/2011_SOTE_Interpretation_Guide.pdf (noting that student feedback ratings tend to be 
higher “if they are not anonymous or the instructor is present, which is why [evaluations] 
are supposed to be administered by student proctors with no interference from faculty 
members”); Seth Heinert & T. Grady Roberts, Factors Motivating Students to Respond to 
Online Course Evaluations in the College of Agricultural and Life Sciences at the University 
of Florida, 60 NACTA J. 189, 189–91 (2016) (noting standard use of proctors or anonymous 
online evaluations in university student evaluations). 
139 See Exhibits to Snell Affirmation, supra note 9, at Exhibit K13 Affidavit of Nora 
Hanna ¶ 13 (“I gave a very positive evaluation, though my impression of Trump was later 
proven wrong.”). 
140  Exhibits to Snell Affirmation, supra note 9, at Exhibit K11 Affidavit of Roberto 
Guillo ¶ 21 (Presenters “pleaded for a favorable rating so that ‘Mr. Trump would invite 
[them] back to do other retreats.’”); see also Michael Barbaro & Steve Eder, Trump Students 
Cite Push to Give Positive Reviews, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2016, at A1 (“[H]undreds of 
pages of legal documents, as well as interviews with former students and instructors, suggest 
the surveys themselves were a central component of a business model that, according to 
lawsuits and investigators, deceived consumers . . . .”). 
141 Christopher J. Fries & R. James McNinch, Signed Versus Unsigned Student 
Evaluations of Teaching: A Comparison, 31 TEACHING SOC. 333, 334 (2003) (“[W]e can 
conclude that asking students to sign evaluation forms leads to more positive ratings across 
the board in all categories.”). 
PETERSON (DO NOT DELETE) 12/14/2017  8:05 PM 
80 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96, 57 
demanded their money back.142 Moreover, President Trump’s claims 
about Trump University’s self-proctored evaluations are impossible to 
reconcile with the BBB’s independent “D-” rating. Finally, President 
Trump’s argument is legally irrelevant. It is not a legally-recognized 
defense to say that a victim of fraud was satisfied with having been lied 
to. The evidence still remains that President Trump and Trump 
University lied to their customers, and that was illegal, regardless of 
what the evaluation forms say. 
III 
PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT FOR HIGH CRIMES AND 
MISDEMEANORS 
The U.S. Constitution provides for impeachment of the President in 
Article 2 Section 4 which reads, 
The President, Vice President and all Civil Officers of the United 
States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and 
Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors.143 
Authority to initiate impeachment proceedings rests exclusively 
with the U.S. House of Representatives,144 while the Senate has sole 
power to try all impeachments.145 No person may be removed from 
office by the Senate without concurrence of two thirds of the senators 
present.146 When the President is on trial, the Chief Justice of the U.S. 
Supreme Court presides.147 
 
142 Julianna Goldman & Laura Strickler, Documents Reveal What Trump Actually Said 
About His University, CBS NEWS (Mar. 7, 2016, 7:46 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com 
/news/elections-2016-donald-trump-university-lawsuits-court-documents-instructors/; see 
also Deposition of Donald Trump at 432, Cohen v. Trump, No. 13-cv-2519-GPC-WVG 
(S.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2016), ECF No. 462–2; Steven Brill, What the Legal Battle Over Trump 
University Reveals About Its Founder, TIME (Nov. 5, 2015), http://time.com/4101290 /what-
the-legal-battle-over-trump-university-reveals-about-its-founder/. 
143 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
144  Id. art. I, § 2. 
145  Id. art. I, § 3. 
146 Id. (stating that upon conviction, the Senate may also disqualify the President from 
the right to “hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States     . 
. . .”); see also ELIZABETH B. BAZAN, IMPEACHMENT: AN OVERVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS, PROCEDURE, AND PRACTICE 5 (Cong. Research Serv. 2010) (demonstrating 
how Senate votes to remove an official or judge from office are distinct from a vote to 
prohibit the individual from holding office at a future time, the latter requiring a simple 
majority). 
147 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3. 
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A. Fraud and Racketeering Constitute Impeachable “High Crimes or 
Misdemeanors” 
The history of federal impeachment has seen much debate over 
whether different types of unethical or illegal conduct rise to the level 
of impeachable high crimes or misdemeanors.148 Mindful of this 
debate, Congress could reasonably conclude that fraud and 
racketeering are impeachable high crimes or misdemeanors based on 
the Constitution’s plain text, the framers intentions, and past 
impeachment precedent. 
1. Plain Meaning 
With respect to textual arguments, a plain reading of the presidential 
impeachment clause seems to suggest that impeachment for fraud and 
racketeering is permissible. The most basic reading of the phrase, 
“other high Crimes and Misdemeanors,” is simply that impeachable 
behavior “is only that which would subject an ordinary person to 
criminal indictment and prosecution.”149 Modifying both “crimes” and 
“misdemeanors,” the adjective “high” suggests that only serious or 
grave offenses warrant impeachment.150 The offenses of fraud and 
racketeering seem to bypass the more difficult legal question of 
 
148 See generally RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 
56–82 (1973) (summarizing 600 years of impeachment history); ASHER C. HINDS, 3 HINDS’ 
PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES (1907) 
(presenting U.S. House of Representatives impeachment materials through the end of the 
nineteenth century); Edward M. Mezvinsky & Doris S. Freedman, Federal Income Tax 
Evasion as an Impeachable Offense, 63 GEO. L.J. 1071, 1080–81 (1975) (arguing President 
Nixon’s tax evasion constituted an impeachable high crime or misdemeanor); E. Mabry 
Rogers & Stephen B. Young, Public Office as a Public Trust: A Suggestion That 
Impeachment for High Crimes and Misdemeanors Implies a Fiduciary Standard, 63 GEO. 
L.J. 1025, 1028, 1040 (1975) (arguing for a fiduciary “breach of public trust” theory of high 
crimes and misdemeanors). 
149 EMILY FIELD VAN TASSEL & PAUL FINKELMAN, IMPEACHABLE OFFENSES: A 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY FROM 1787 TO THE PRESENT 6 (1999). 
150 See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK 40 (1974) (“General 
lowness and shabbiness ought not to be enough.”); Frank O. Bowman, III & Stephen L. 
Sepinuck, “High Crimes and Misdemeanors”: Defining the Constitutional Limits on 
Presidential Impeachment, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1517, 1529 (1999) (“[A] ‘high crime or 
misdemeanor’ must be an offense of the most serious kind.”); Paul Fenton, The Scope of 
Impeachment Power, 65 NW. U.L. REV. 719, 746 (1970) (“[I]t is extremely difficult to 
define the proper standards for an impeachable offense in affirmative terms . . . . The only 
generalization which can safely be made is that an impeachable offense must be serious in 
nature.”). 
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whether “misdemeanors” includes impeachment for nonindictable 
offenses.151 
Fraud and racketeering are certainly grave in that they are crimes 
punishable by lengthy prison sentences in all fifty states. For example, 
in New York, where President Trump faced allegations of fraud, 
A person is guilty of a scheme to defraud in the first degree when he 
. . . engages in a scheme constituting a systematic ongoing course of 
conduct with intent to defraud ten or more persons or to obtain 
property from ten or more persons by false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations or promises, and so obtains property from one or 
more of such persons . . . .152 
First degree fraud is a class E felony in New York153 and is 
punishable by imprisonment for up to four years.154 
Similarly, under federal law, mail fraud and wire fraud are serious 
felonies. The United States Code states that 
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or 
artifice to defraud, . . . places in any post office or authorized 
depository for mail . . . any matter or thing whatever to be sent or 
delivered by the Postal Service, . . . shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.155 
While President Trump faced allegations of mail and wire fraud as 
predicate RICO offenses in Cohen v. Trump, RICO violations are also 
serious crimes in and of themselves. Under RICO, “[w]hoever violates 
any provision of section 1962 of this chapter shall be fined under this 
title or imprisoned not more than 20 years.”156 
Some have argued that the word “other,” modifying high crimes and 
misdemeanors, suggests the phrase “other high crimes and 
misdemeanors” should include only those crimes that are similar in 
nature to bribery and treason.157 This view draws on the traditional 
 
151 See Alex Simpson, Jr., Federal Impeachments, 64 U. PA. L. REV. 651, 678 (1916) (“If 
the word ‘misdemeanors’ refers only to criminal misdemeanors, then it is a useless and 
unnecessary word, for it is embraced within the word ‘crimes’ and the clause might as well 
have read only ‘treason, bribery, or other high crimes.’”). 
152 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.65 (McKinney 2008). 
153 Id. 
154 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.00(2)(e) (McKinney 2004). 
155 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2016); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2016) (“[T]he term ‘scheme or 
artifice to defraud’ includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of 
honest services.”). 
156 18 U.S.C. § 1693(a) (2016). 
157 See Background and History of Impeachment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 84 (1998) (statement of 
Cass R. Sunstein) (applying ejusdem generis to the impeachment clause to argue “other high 
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cannon of construction, ejusdem generis—meaning ‘of the same 
kind.”158 However, if only crimes closely akin to bribery and treason 
are impeachable, then the word “misdemeanor” would be superfluous 
since neither bribery nor treason are mere misdemeanors.159 Arguably, 
unlike treason and bribery which involve a crime against the state, the 
United States government was not a victim of Trump University. Still, 
members of Congress could reasonably conclude that the word “other” 
preceding high crimes or misdemeanors signals an intention to depart 
from an overly narrow reading. 
Besides, even if high crimes and misdemeanors include only crimes 
similar in nature to treason and bribery, in an important sense, fraud 
and racketeering plausibly qualify. Treason, bribery, fraud, and 
racketeering are all forms of corruption that members of Congress 
could reasonably conclude pose a threat to the honest and efficient 
operation of government. Arguably, both treason and bribery are 
particular subspecies of fraud insofar as each requires a betrayal of trust 
and are implemented through tactics of deception. Congress could 
conclude that the Trump University wealth seminars were a betrayal of 
those who trusted President Trump to help them fulfill their aspirations. 
The evidence uncovered in the Trump University cases points to a form 
of corruption and betrayal that should be of great concern to those that 
fear corruption and misuse of governmental power. 
2. Framers’ Intent 
Congress could also reasonably conclude that the founders intended 
the crimes of fraud and racketeering to be impeachment-worthy. The 
founders dedicated significant debate to the precise formulation of 
impeachable offenses, amending the text of the Constitution several 
 
Crimes and Misdemeanors” must be like in kind to treason and bribery); Bowman & 
Sepinuck, supra note 150, at 1528 (“When the Constitution authorizes impeachment for 
‘Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors,’ it is saying that a President 
may be removed for committing treason, taking bribes, or performing other acts similar both 
in type and seriousness to bribery and treason.”). 
158 See, e.g., Walling v. Peavy-Wilson Lumber Co., 49 F. Supp. 846, 859 (W.D. La. 
1943) (Where “general words follow the enumerations of particular classes or persons or 
things, the general words shall be construed as applicable only to persons or things of the 
same general nature or kind as those enumerated.”). This argument has similarly been based 
on the noscitur a sociis (“it is known by the company it keeps”). See Simpson, supra note 
151, at 679. 
159 See Simpson, supra note 151, at 679 (“[i]nasmuch as the words ‘other high crimes’ 
exhaust the possibility of everything which ‘in codem sensu’ could be ejusdcm generis with 
‘treason’ and ‘bribery,’ and hence the word ‘misdemeanors’ must be discarded as useless, 
which is forbidden, or else it must be given other than a criminal meaning . . . .”). 
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times before arriving at the phrase “treason, bribery, or other high 
crimes and misdemeanors.”160 An early drafting committee proposed 
language providing that federal officers “shall be liable to impeachment 
and removal from office for neglect of duty, malversation, or 
corruption.”161 A later draft of the Constitution allowed impeachment 
for “high crimes and misdemeanors against the States.”162 Still another 
draft revised the language to allow impeachment for “high crimes and 
misdemeanors against the United States.”163 But, the fact that all these 
phrases were eventually eliminated suggests that the framers ultimately 
decided to take a broader view of potentially impeachable high 
crimes.164 
Some scholars have noted that the framers drew the phrase “other 
high crimes and misdemeanors” out of longstanding English 
parliamentary precedent.165 The British government began using an 
impeachment procedure as early as the thirteenth century.166 The term 
high crimes and misdemeanors was a technical term-of-art that evolved 
within the context of a long political and legal history.167 But even 
English sources disagree on the meaning of the term. For example, 
Blackstone took the view that a crime in violation of some “already 
known and established law” was a prerequisite to impeachment.168 But 
 
160 BERGER, supra note 148, at 77–81. 
161 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 337 (Max Farrand ed., rev. vol. 
1937) [hereinafter FEDERAL CONVENTION]; see also Bowman & Sepinuck, supra note 150, 
at 1524 (summarizing evolution of the high crimes and misdemeanors phrasing at the 
Constitutional Convention). 
162 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 161, at 551 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
163 Id.; see also Simpson, supra note 151, at 665 (extracting relevant passages from 
Farrand’s Records). 
164 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 161, at 600. Some have suggested that “against 
the United States” may have been removed as a matter of style without an intent to change 
the meaning. Edwin Brown Firmage, The Law of Presidential Impeachment, 1973 UTAH L. 
REV. 681, 694 (1973); Jack N. Rakove, Statement on the Background and History of 
Impeachment, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 682, 687 n.25 (1999). 
165 BERGER, supra note 148, at 54. 
166 Simpson, supra note 151, at 651. 
167 BERGER, supra note 148, at 70–71; Impeachment Inquiry Staff of the House Judiciary 
Comm., Constitutional Grounds for Impeachment, in HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS: 
SELECTED MATERIALS ON IMPEACHMENT 1, 3 (1973); HINDS, supra note 148, at 322. 
168 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 256 (Univ. 
of Chi. Press 1979) (1769) (“[A]n impeachment before the lords by the commons of Great 
Britain, in parliament, is a prosecution of the already known and established law, and has 
been frequently put in practice; being a presentment to the most high and supreme court of 
criminal jurisdiction by the most solemn grand inquest of the whole kingdom.”) (all original 
use of the descending s has been changed to modern letterform). But see Simpson, supra 
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Parliament did in fact impeach officials for nonindictable actions in 
derogation of their office. As Raul Berger noted, Parliament impeached 
the Duke of Suffolk in 1450 because he “procured offices for persons 
who were unfit and unworthy of them” and the Duke of Buckingham 
because he, “though young and inexperienced, procured offices for 
himself [and] thereby blocked the deserving.”169 Early American 
colonial impeachment laws and practices may have had even more 
influence on the framers than English customs.170 Either way, pre-
Constitutional British and colonial precedent perhaps has only limited 
value because “the framers set forth a special impeachment mechanism 
in the Constitution that reflected their intention to differentiate the 
newly proposed federal impeachment process from the English and 
state experiences with impeachment prior to 1787.”171 
Moreover, the founders did not speak with a unified voice on what 
actions constitute a high crime or misdemeanor.172 Alexander 
Hamilton, writing in the Federalist no. 65, argued that impeachable 
offenses “are those offenses which proceed from the misconduct of 
public men, or, in other words, from the abuse or violation of some 
public trust. They are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be 
denominated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done 
immediately to the society itself.”173 Hamilton’s view must be taken 
with some sense of caution because “Hamilton disagreed with the final 
version of the federal impeachment process and he left the 
constitutional convention long before the Constitution was formally 
approved.”174 James Wilson, an influential delegate to the 
Constitutional Convention, law professor, and one of the first Supreme 
 
note 151, at 694 (“[I]t must be said that Blackstone had no better light upon this subject than 
we have . . . .”). 
169 BERGER, supra note 148, at 67–68; see also Firmage, supra note 164, at 683 
(“Charges against Attorney General Yelverton in 1621 also included non-criminal offenses 
such as failing to prosecute after commencing suits and exercising authority before it was 
properly vested in him.”). 
170 PETER CHARLES HOFFER & N.E.H. HULL, IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA, 1635–1805 
268 (1984). 
171 MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 3 (2d ed. 2000); see also Fenton, supra note 
150, at 721 (“Although the English practice is undoubtedly of substantial value in construing 
the impeachment clause, to accept this precedent as an inflexible and unchanging standard 
would be a grave error.”). 
172 Simpson, supra note 151, at 694–95; BAZAN, supra note 146, at 28. 
173 THE FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Alexander Hamilton). 
174 GERHARDT, supra note 171, at 13. 
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Court Justices, held a similar view.175 Wilson argued that impeachment 
proceedings are “of a political nature . . . confined to political 
characters, to political crimes and misdemeanors, and to political 
punishments.”176 Historians have explained that these references to 
political offenses were not simply acts that one faction might disagree 
with, but were “some palpable abuse or violation of some public 
trust.”177 
Nevertheless, in a contextually critical sense, the question of 
whether fraud and racketeering are impeachable offenses easily 
sidesteps “the most closely debated issue” in “the 200 year history of 
[federal] impeachments”—namely, whether Congress may impeach 
for nonindictable crimes.178 Hamilton and Wilson’s statements 
favoring a public or political criterion in impeachable offenses should 
be viewed in the context of this debate. That is to say, there is stronger, 
more historically robust support for the notion that nonindictable 
offenses must be political in nature to rise to the level of 
impeachability. There is much less historical support for the notion that 
indictable, serious crimes must also be political in nature. 
Moreover, the notion that impeachment should be connected to 
exclusively political offenses was not uniformly shared by all the 
framers and it was far from clear where the boundary between personal 
and political offenses was to be drawn. For example, writing in 
Federalist No. 64, John Jay explained that the Constitution had “taken 
the utmost care” that Presidents shall be persons “of talents and 
integrity” and, “so far as the fear of punishment and disgrace can 
operate, that motive to good behavior is amply afforded by the article 
on the subject of impeachments.”179 The policy objectives of 
competence, integrity, and good behavior invoked by Jay seem as 
loosely tied to pubic wrongs as the plain text of the Constitution itself. 
Similarly, Madison’s remarks during the Constitutional Convention 
seem to take a broader view about the constitutional role of 
 
175 Id. at 21. 
176 Id. 
177 HOFFER & HULL, supra note 170, at 101 (discussing THE FEDERALIST NO. 65 
(Alexander Hamilton)). 
178 Fenton, supra note 150, at 725–26; see, e.g., James St. Clair et al., An Analysis of the 
Constitutional Standard for Presidential Impeachment, reprinted in 1 CONSTITUTIONAL 
ASPECTS OF WATERGATE: DOCUMENTS AND MATERIALS 112, 139 (A. Stephen Boyan, Jr. 
ed., 1976) [hereinafter WATERGATE DOCUMENTS] (Attorneys for President Nixon arguing, 
“[i]n considering the legal and widely understood meaning of the phrase ‘other high crimes 
and misdemeanors’ it is clear that it is limited solely to criminal conduct.”). 
179 THE FEDERALIST NO. 64 (John Jay). 
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impeachment. He argued that it was “indispensable that some provision 
should be made for defending the Community against [sic] the 
incapacity, negligence or perfidy of the chief magistrate.”180 Madison 
went on to list some of his concerns: 
[The President] might lose his capacity after his appointment. He 
might pervert his administration into a scheme of peculation or 
oppression. He might betray his trust to foreign powers. The case of 
the Executive Magistracy was very distinguishable, from that of the 
Legislative or of any other public body, holding offices of limited 
duration. It could not be presumed that all or even a majority of the 
members of an Assembly would either lose their capacity for 
discharging, or be bribed to betray, their trust. Besides the restraints 
of their personal integrity & honor, the difficulty of acting in concert 
for purposes of corruption was a security to the public. And if one or 
a few members only should be seduced, the soundness of the 
remaining members, would maintain the integrity and fidelity of the 
body. In the case of the Executive Magistracy which was to be 
administered by a single man, loss of capacity or corruption was more 
within the compass of probable events, and either of them might be 
fatal to the Republic.181 
Even more direct, Benjamin Franklin took a related, yet distinct, 
view that impeachment was necessary to remove an officer who had 
“rendered himself obnoxious” and thereby provide a “regular 
punishment” that would avoid the chaos of assassination and allow 
“honorable acquittal when he should be unjustly accused.”182 
Arguably, a heinous offense such as a murder for personal ends or a 
rape could be sufficiently “obnoxious” to trigger Franklin’s demand for 
regular punishment, even though both crimes might qualify as private 
rather than political.183 As Judge Posner more recently observed, “at 
some point the personal becomes political.”184 Perhaps synthesizing 
these concerns, Judge Posner has argued that the “abuse of power was 
 
180 FEDERAL CONVENTION, surpa note 161, at 65. 
181 Id. at 65–66; see also id. at 65 (statement of Gouverneur Morris agreeing that 
impeachment was necessary for “corruption & some few other Offences”). 
182 Id. at 65 (statements of Benjamin Franklin on assassination and the historical example 
of the Prince of Orange in the war between France and Holland). Drawing on this language, 
Professor Josh Chafetz has thoughtfully argued it was the fear of despots—Julius Caesar 
and Charles I in particular—that led the founding fathers to establish an impeachment 
procedure for the President. Josh Chafetz, Impeachment and Assassination, 95 MINN. L. 
REV. 347, 348, 367 (2010); see also Firmage, supra note 164, at 690 (noting a similar point). 
183 BLACK, supra note 150, at 39; Bowman & Sepinuck, supra note 150, at 1553. 
184 RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE INVESTIGATION, IMPEACHMENT, 
AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON 109 (1999). 
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the principal concern of the framers.”185 Professors Frank Bowman and 
Stephen Sepichuk’s thoughtful law review article argues that 
impeachment for nonpolitical offenses is permissible, but that the 
threshold of gravity or seriousness should be raised as the alleged 
offense strays further from the functions of the President’s office.186 
Some crimes may be so outrageous that Congress cannot ignore them, 
even if they do not fall within the paradigmatic offenses involving 
misuse of office, abuse of power, or threats to the constitutional 
order.187 
There is also no question that some of the framers were concerned 
with the use of impeachment as a political weapon. For example, at the 
Constitutional Convention, Charles Pinkney worried that by making 
the Senate the “court of impeachment,” it would render the President 
“too dependent on the Legislature” and thereby, “[i]f he opposes a 
favorite law, the two Houses will combine against [sic] him, and under 
the influence of heat and faction throw him out of office.”188 But, the 
absence of a single instance of a removed President in the history of the 
republic seems to confirm Hugh Williamson’s rejoinder to Pinkey that, 
in fact, “there was more danger of too much lenity than of too much 
rigour towards the President.”189 
Of course the framers had no occasion to explicitly discuss the 
particular crimes of fraud or racketeering. Indeed, Congress adopted 
the federal racketeering statute nearly two centuries after the 
Constitutional Convention. Nevertheless, today Congress could easily 
conclude that the crimes of fraud and racketeering were well within the 
scope of the framers’ view of “other high crimes and misdemeanors.” 
 
185 Id. at 104. Several commentators have argued against a plain reading of the words 
“high crimes and misdemeanors” in favor of the view that only crimes relating to an 
official’s public office are impeachable. See BLACK, supra note 150, at 35; VAN TASSEL & 
FINKELMAN, supra note 149, at 6; Bowman & Sepinuck, supra note 150, at 1523; Merill 
Otis, A Proposed Tribunal: Is It Constitutional?, 7 KAN. CITY L. REV. 3, 22 (1938); C.S. 
Potts, Impeachment as a Remedy, 12 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 15, 24 (1927). 
186 Bowman & Sepinuck, supra note 150, at 1557 (suggesting that crimes are more 
impeachable the more closely they relate to the functions of the president’s office). But see 
BLACK, supra note 150, at 37 (arguing impeachable high crimes and misdemeanors ought 
to include offenses “(1) which are extremely serious, (2) which in some way corrupt or 
subvert the governmental process, and (3) which are plainly wrong in themselves to a person 
of honor . . . .”); Background and History of Impeachment, supra note 157 (arguing for 
impeachment of a President only for “egregious misconduct that amounts to the abusive 
misuse of the authority of his office”). 
187 Michael J. Gerhardt, The Lessons of Impeachment History, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
603, 620–21 (1999). 
188 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 161, at 551. 
189 Id. 
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Jay surely would have viewed those crimes as evidence of a lack of 
integrity and inconsistent with good behavior.190 Both crimes seem to 
fit Madison’s notion of a “scheme of peculation.”191 Morris would 
probably have viewed them as worthy of his fears of “corruption.”192 
And while Hamilton and Wilson favored a political approach to 
impeachment, they would perhaps be hard pressed to explain how 
employing a band of traveling salesmen to conduct a nationwide 
campaign to defraud thousands of citizens is not “the abuse or violation 
of some public trust.”193 President Trump’s allegedly fraudulent, 
nationwide advertising campaign for his Trump University scam is far 
from a private indiscretion behind closed doors. While such a 
peculative scheme itself may not pose a threat to the republic’s 
constitutional order, reasonable observers might conclude the scheme’s 
author was capable of just the sort of tyranny the founders feared most. 
Can anyone doubt that Franklin would have viewed these acts as 
“obnoxious”?194 For his part, George Washington remained stoically 
silent during all the Constitutional Convention’s impeachment 
debates.195 But surely we can be confident he would have viewed 
tawdry frauds against vulnerable and trusting people with quiet, but 
utter, disdain.196 
3. Congressional Precedent 
Congressional leaders that look to past impeachment precedent will 
find support for the view that fraud and racketeering are impeachable 
high crimes and misdemeanors. The House of Representatives has 
voted to impeach federal officials on sixteen occasions, including two 
Presidents, a cabinet member, a senator, a Supreme Court justice, and 
eleven other federal judges.197 The Senate has convicted eight 
 
190 THE FEDERALIST NO. 64 (John Jay). 
191 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 161, at 65–66. 
192 Id. at 65. 
193 THE FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Alexander Hamilton). 
194 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 161, at 65. 
195 Id. passim. 
196 See George Washington, To The People of the United States, in WASHINGTON’S 
FAREWELL ADDRESS, S. DOC. NO. 106–21, at 20–21 (2000) (explaining that “virtue or 
morality is a necessary spring of popular government. The rule indeed extends with more or 
less force to every species of free government. Who that is a sincere friend to it can look 
with indifference upon attempts to shake the foundation of the fabric?”). 
197 List of Individuals Impeached by the House of Representatives, U.S. HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES (2017) [hereinafter Individuals Impeached], http://history.house.gov 
/Institution/Impeachment/Impeachment-List/. 
PETERSON (DO NOT DELETE) 12/14/2017  8:05 PM 
90 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96, 57 
officials.198  Furthermore, many others have resigned under threat of 
impeachment including, most notably, President Nixon.199 Congress’ 
impeachment deliberations with respect to Presidents Johnson, Nixon, 
and Clinton, as well as the federal judges impeached and removed by 
Congress, are worth comparing to President Trump’s alleged fraud and 
racketeering. 
Beginning with President Johnson, his post-Civil War impeachment 
proceedings arose in the tumultuous period following President 
Lincoln’s assassination. President Johnson, a unionist Tennessee 
Democrat, was included on President Lincoln’s ticket in order to build 
national unity during the 1864 election.200 With strong Southern 
sympathies, President Johnson soon began to clash with the 
Republican-dominated Congress, bent on enforcing congressional will 
in the reconstructing-South and extracting political concession before 
readmitting Southern states to the Union.201 After repealing their 
ordinances of recession at the end of the Civil War, many Southern 
states reconstituted their prior state governments and adopted laws 
consigning former slaves to nonvoting, second class citizenship.202 
Called “black codes,” these laws established rules on vagrancy, 
apprenticeship, labor contracts, migration, as well as civil and legal 
rights, all with the goal of making blacks “slaves in everything but 
name.”203 
Congress responded by adopting the Civil Rights Act of 1866, over 
President Johnson’s veto.204 The statute defined African Americans as 
citizens and preempted the contrary state laws.205 Then, despite 
President Johnson’s opposition yet again, Congress voted to adopt the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which was eventually ratified by the states.206 
 
198 Id. 
199 John Herbers, Nixon Resigns, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1974, at A1; see also Justice’s 
Resignation First Under Impeachment Threat, 25 CQ ALMANAC 136, 137 (1969), 
http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/cqal69-1247815 (discussing resignation of Justice 
Abe Fortas). 
200 DAVID E. KYVIG, THE AGE OF IMPEACHMENT: AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
CULTURE SINCE 1960 25–26 (2008). 
201 ERIC L. MCKITRICK, ANDREW JOHNSON AND RECONSTRUCTION 3 (1960). 
202 KYVIG, supra note 200, at 26. 
203 W.E. BURGHARDT DUBOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 167 (1935). 
204 Barry Sullivan, Historical Reconstruction, Reconstruction History, and the Proper 
Scope of Section 198, 98 YALE L. J. 541, 549 n.56 (1989) (“When Congress eventually 
overrode Johnson’s veto of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, it was the first time that Congress 
had ever overridden a President on a major political issue.”). 
205 DUBOIS, supra note 203, at 248–50. 
206 MCKITRICK, supra note 201, at 351; KYVIG, supra note 200, at 29. 
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These political conflicts came to a head when Congress adopted the 
constitutionally dubious Tenure of Office Act. The act required Senate 
approval before the President dismissed any officer previously 
confirmed by the Senate.207 A constitutional crisis emerged when 
President Johnson attempted to remove the Secretary of War, Edwin 
Stanton.208 The House responded by quickly voting to impeach 
President Johnson on eleven articles of impeachment, “nine dealing 
with Stanton in one way or another.”209 Although the Tenure of Office 
Act included a criminal penalty for noncompliance, none of the articles 
of impeachment accused President Johnson of an act traditionally 
recognized as an indictable crime.210 Instead, the articles of 
impeachment generally relied on the British technical understanding of 
high crimes and misdemeanors as official misconduct.211 Following 
the House’s impeachment vote, the Senate voted thirty-five to nineteen 
in favor of conviction—missing the required two-thirds majority by a 
single vote.212 
The story of the Watergate scandal preceding President Nixon’s 
resignation is lengthy and well known.213 As details of the scandal 
emerged, the House Judiciary Committee voted to recommend three 
articles of impeachment.214 The first article accused President Nixon 
of personally engaging in a course of conduct to cover up any White 
House involvement in the burglary at the Democratic Party’s national 
headquarters.215 Among other actions, the House Judiciary Committee 
 
207 See Michael Les Benedict, A New Look at the Impeachment of Andrew Johnson, 88 
POL. SCI. Q. 349, 364–66 (1973). 
208 See id. at 366–67. 
209 KYVIG, supra note 200, at 28. The House Judiciary Committee first considered 
impeachment of President Johnson in November of 1867. The committee voted five to four 
against impeachment on the grounds that the articles did not include allegations of any 
specific crime by the President. JOHN R. LABOVITZ, PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 49 
(1978). 
210 Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 154, § 6, 14 Stat. 430, 431 (regulating the tenure of certain 
civil offices); see also LABOVITZ, supra note 209, at 56, 66. 
211 Hon. William Lawrence, A Brief of the Authorities Upon the Law of Impeachable 
Crimes and Misdemeanors, reprinted in 1 TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON, PRESIDENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES, BEFORE THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, ON IMPEACHMENT BY THE 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FOR HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 123, 128–29 (Da 
Capo Press 1970) (1868). 
212 LABOVITZ, supra note 209, at 88. 
213 See, e.g., CARL BERNSTEIN & BOB WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT’S MEN (1974) 
(Washington Post coverage of the Watergate scandal). 
214 H.R. REP. NO. 93-1305 (1974), reprinted in WATERGATE DOCUMENTS, supra note 
178, at 1–4. 
215 Id. at 1–2, art. I. 
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concluded that President Nixon approved surreptitious hush-money 
payments to the Watergate burglars.216 The second article of 
impeachment accused President Nixon of misusing government 
agencies to conduct illegal surveillance and violate constitutional 
rights.217 The third article recommended impeachment for refusing to 
comply with congressional subpoenas.218 The Judiciary Committee 
considered, but voted against, two additional articles of impeachment 
on President Nixon’s efforts to conceal the war in Cambodia and tax 
evasion.219 With respect to the tax evasion article, the Committee voted 
against impeachment twelve to twenty-six with at least some members 
of the Committee basing their decisions on the lack of evidence of the 
President’s direct involvement, rather than the impeachability of tax 
fraud as a crime.220 Once his impeachment and removal appeared 
inevitable, President Nixon resigned from office before the full House 
of Representatives had an opportunity to debate or act on the Judiciary 
Committee’s recommendations.221 
In 1998, the House of Representatives began deliberations on the 
impeachment of President Clinton following a lengthy investigation 
and report by Independent Counsel, Kenneth Starr.222 The 
impeachment proceedings arose out of alleged misrepresentations 
made by President Clinton regarding a sexual relationship with a White 
House intern.223 The House Judiciary Committee, voting mostly along 
partisan lines, recommended impeachment on four articles: (1) perjury 
before a grand jury, (2) perjury during a deposition in a private civil 
rights lawsuit, (3) obstruction of justice by attempting to influence 
witnesses in a private civil rights case, and (4) misusing the office of 
the Presidency by making false or misleading statements to 
Congress.224 The House of Representatives voted to impeach on the 
 
216 Id. at 2, art. I, § 5. 
217 Id. at 3, art. II. 
218 Id. at 4, art. III. 
219 Id. at 38–39. 
220 Id. at 45 (roll call vote). For example, one Congressman who voted for impeachment 
on the Watergate-related articles, voted against the tax fraud Article because “[t]he evidence 
before the Congress demonstrates that the President engaged in unethical, shabby and 
disgraceful conduct by grossly underpaying his income taxes while in office. There is, 
however, no clear and convincing evidence . . . of fraud by the President himself.” Id. at 39 
(additional views of Wayne Owens). 
221 Edwin Brown Firmage & R. Collin Mangrum, Removal of the President: Resignation 
and the Procedural Law of Impeachment, 1974 DUKE L.J. 1023, 1094 (1974). 
222 See H.R. DOC. NO. 105-310 (1998). 
223 See id. at 131–50. 
224 H.R. REP. NO. 105-830, at 1–5 (1998). 
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first (228–206) and third (221–212) articles.225 After a trial with Chief 
Justice Rehnquist presiding, the Senate acquitted on the perjury article 
with forty-five votes for conviction and fifty-five votes against.226 The 
obstruction of justice vote was equally divided with fifty for conviction 
and fifty against—seventeen votes short of the required two-thirds 
majority.227 President Clinton’s impeachment is the only impeachment 
in history arising out of efforts to conceal marital infidelity.228 
The alleged fraud and racketeering in the Trump University cases 
bear an imperfect, but plausible, comparison to the abuse of power and 
betrayal of public trust that have motivated some of the federal 
impeachments and removal proceedings of the past. At the level of 
presidential impeachments, the Trump University fraud and 
racketeering did not pose a threat to the constitutional order like 
President Johnson’s willful disregard of the (constitutionally dubious) 
Tenure of Office Act. On the other hand, unlike the Johnson 
impeachment, President Trump’s alleged offenses are clearly 
indictable crimes that would ordinarily be understood to be within the 
plain meaning of the phrase “high crimes.” 
Unlike President Nixon’s involvement in the Watergate Democratic 
National Committee break in, President Trump’s alleged fraud and 
racketeering were not crimes committed against the machinery of 
government. However, President Trump’s alleged crimes did have 
strains of deceit comparable to President Nixon’s cover up of the 
Watergate scandal.229 For example, just  as President Nixon went on 
 
225 Final Vote Results for Roll Call, 543 H.R. Res. 611, 105th Cong. (1998), 
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1998/roll543.xml#Y; Final Vote Results for Roll Call 545, H.R. 
Res. 611, 105th Cong. (1998), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1998/roll545.xml; see also Peter 
Baker & Juliet Eilperin, Clinton Impeached: House Approves Articles Alleging Perjury, 
Obstruction, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 1998, at A1. 
226 S. DOC. NO. 106-4 (1999); Peter Baker & Helen Dewar, The Senate Acquits President 
Clinton, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1999, at A1. 
227 Baker & Dewar, supra note 226. 
228 JARED P. COLE & TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44260, IMPEACHMENT 
AND REMOVAL 12–13 (2015) (listing impeachments for actions incompatible with the 
function and purpose of office). In 2009 the House impeached Judge Sameul B. Kent from 
the Southern District of Texas for allegedly sexually assaulting two court employees and 
later obstructing justice and lying to FBI agents to conceal the assaults. H.R. REP. NO. 111-
159, at 2–3, 22–24 (2009). 
229 See H.R. REP. NO. 93-1305, supra note 214, at 1–2 art. I, § 8 (recommending 
impeachment of President Nixon for “making or causing to be made false or misleading 
public statements for the purpose of deceiving the people of the United States into believing 
that a thorough and complete investigation had been conducted with respect to allegations 
of misconduct on the part of personnel of the executive branch of the United States and 
personnel of the Committee for the Re-election of the President . . . .”). 
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national television to the tell the country that he was “not a crook,” in 
a televised presidential debate President Trump attempted to deceive 
the public about the D- rating his “university” received from the 
BBB.230 Although President Trump did not abuse the office of the 
Presidency in connection with Trump University, reasonable members 
of Congress could conclude that he did abuse his position of trust as the 
founder of his allegedly fraudulent real estate seminars. Congress could 
conclude that this abuse of power and breach of trust is indicative of 
President Trump’s likely future behavior. It is meaningful that in two 
of the three instances of serious presidential impeachment deliberations 
by Congress, deception was an essential feature of the alleged 
offenses.231 The Trump University cases were at their core cases of 
deception by President Trump for his personal gain. While these 
deceptions occurred prior to his time in office—a point discussed in the 
next section—the fact remains that Congress could conclude that these 
deceptions reflect a comparable lack of integrity and moral character to 
that demonstrated in President Nixon’s impeachment proceedings. 
President Trump’s alleged fraud and racketeering also have some 
similarities to President Clinton’s impeachment. Both President 
Clinton and President Trump’s deceptions were arguably indictable 
crimes—perjury in the case of Clinton and fraud and racketeering in 
the case of President Trump. Moreover, both of the alleged crimes had 
a relatively oblique connection to the constitutional order. Arguably, 
President Clinton’s alleged grand jury perjury was an offense against 
the state because his lie was made in a judicial proceeding under oath. 
But, President Trump’s alleged lies were more publicly facing in that 
they were part of a national marketing campaign of peculative deceit 
against consumers—rather than to conceal a personal, sexual 
indiscretion. 
The publically facing nature of President Trump’s alleged fraud and 
racketeering, combined with the fact that the Constitution does not 
explicitly require (and indeed was expressly edited not to require) a 
crime against the government, suggests that President Trump’s alleged 
crimes are at least as plausible a basis for a high crime or misdemeanor 
as was President Clinton’s perjury. In at least one respect, the case for 
President Trump’s impeachment is stronger than all three prior 
presidential impeachment proceedings. In none of the three prior 
 
230 See BETTER BUS. BUREAU, supra note 57. 
231 See H.R. REP NO. 93-1305, supra note 214, at 2; H.R. REP. NO. 105-830, at 1–5 
(1998). 
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presidential impeachment proceedings had a federal judge already 
ruled that evidence would justify a reasonable trier of fact in concluding 
that the President committed each legal element required to show a 
grave, indictable crime of deceit. 
Past judicial impeachments also offer some basis of comparison to 
President Trump’s alleged fraud and racketeering. Like the president 
and the vice president, “civil officers”—including federal judges—are 
subject to the Article II clause providing for impeachment and removal 
for “other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”232 However, under Article 
III, judges also serve life terms “during good Behaviour.”233 Some 
commentators have argued that by reading these provisions together, 
the Constitution provides a lower standard for impeachment and 
removal for judges than for the president, vice president, or other 
nonjudicial, civil officers.234 Even still, examining impeachment and 
removal precedent necessitates looking at judicial impeachment 
because of the eight convictions in the history of the republic, all were 
judges. Table 1 lists these judges, the year of their convictions, and 














232 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
233 Id. art. III, § 1. 
234 See Raoul Berger, Impeachment of Judges and “Good Behavior” Tenure, 79 YALE 
L.J. 1475, 1529 (1970) (“[S]ince impeachable offenses, i.e., ‘high crimes and 
misdemeanors,’ are not identical with all breaches of ‘good behavior’ but merely overlap in 
the case of ‘great offenses,’ there exists an implied power to remove judges whose 
‘misbehavior’ falls short of ‘high crimes and misdemeanors.’”). On the other hand, 
Federalist No. 64 appears to apply the phrase “good behavior” directly to the presidential 
impeachments suggesting that some framers may have viewed the judicial and presidential 
standards as comparable. THE FEDERALIST NO. 64 (John Jay) (“[T]hat motive to good 
behavior is amply afforded by the article on the subject of impeachments.”). 
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Table 1. Impeached and Convicted United States Officials, 1787-2016 
Year Individual Office Summary of Offenses 
1804 John Pickering Judge (D. 
N.H.) 
Intentional evasion and disregard of 
property law in adjudication; 
Intoxication and blasphemy on the 
bench. 




Incitement of rebellion against the 
U.S.; Refusal to hold court; Waging 
war against the U.S. Government; 
Ordering unlawful arrests. 
1913 Robert W. 
Archbald 
Judge (3d Cir.) Corruptly took advantage of his 
position in order to profit for himself; 
Bribery. 




Receiving kickbacks; Practicing law 
as a sitting judge; Tax evasion; 
Bringing his court into scandal and 
disrepute. 









Conspiracy to solicit a bribe; Perjury. 




Perjury before a federal grand jury. 




Accepting bribes; Perjury. 
Source: U.S. House of Representatives, Office of the Historian, List of Individuals
Impeached by the House of Representatives (2016), http://history.house.gov 
/Institution/Impeachment/Impeachment-List/. 
While a detailed analysis of each judicial impeachment and 
conviction is beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that 
Congress has impeached and removed judges for dishonesty—
including deceptions of a personal financial nature. For example, in 
1912, the House impeached and the Senate convicted Judge Robert W. 
Archbald, from the Third Circuit, for bribery and hearing cases where 
he had a financial conflict of interest.235 In 1936, the House of 
Representatives voted to impeach Judge Halstead L. Ritter for, among 
 
235 H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., IMPEACHMENT: SELECTED MATERIALS, 
176–83 (Comm. Print 1973). 
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other allegations, tax fraud.236 A majority of the Senate voted to 
remove Judge Ritter on a tax evasion article, but the vote fell just short 
of the required two-thirds threshold.237 Instead, over two-thirds of the 
Senate voted to remove Judge Ritter on the grounds that his actions 
brought his court “into scandal and disrepute.”238 In 1986, the House 
impeached and the Senate removed Judge Harry Claiborne on articles 
that related exclusively to tax fraud.239 And most recently, in 2010, the 
House impeached and the Senate convicted, Judge Porteous on articles 
relating to his receipt of cash and favors from lawyers appearing in his 
court, using a false name to elude creditors, and intentionally 
misleading the Senate during his confirmation.240 
Indeed, in six of the eight successful impeachment convictions—
seventy-five percent of all convictions upon impeachments in the 
history of the republic—some form of deceptive conduct was included 
within the articles of impeachment. And yet, one might argue that never 
in the history of the republic has a there been an impeachment trial 
concerning a pattern of deception so widespread and sustained as 
President Trump’s involvement with Trump University. 
At the most basic level, the dollar amounts at issue in the alleged 
Trump University fraud and racketeering claims dwarf the sums 
involved in every prior impeachment and removal involving financial 
deception. Arguably, the Trump University cases displayed a more 
troubling level of cupidity than past convictions. For example, Judge 
Ritter and Judge Claiborne’s tax frauds victimized the general public 
by failing to pay their fair share and leaving others to fund the general 
federal revenue without them. In contrast, Trump University left many 
vulnerable families and seniors bankrupt by directly and intentionally 
taking every liquid asset they had. 
By believing in President Trump’s allegedly false promises, these 
students invested their life savings, maxed out their credit cards, and 
cashed in their retirement savings in the hope of learning President 
Trump’s real estate secrets from his handpicked mentors. Congress 
could conclude that President Trump’s alleged fraud was more 
 
236 H.R. Res. 440, 74th Cong. (1936); see also S. DOC. NO. 74-200, at 627–39 (1936). 
237 80 CONG. REC. 5602–08 (1936); see also S. Doc. No. 74-200, at 636 (1936). 
238 80 CONG. REC. 5606 (1936). 
239 132 CONG. REC. 17,295–306 (1986) (impeachment articles alleging “Claiborne 
willfully and knowingly filed a federal income tax return for the year 1979 that failed to 
report a substantial amount of income”). 
240 H.R REP. NO. 111-427, at 2–5 (2010); Jennifer Steinhauer, Senate, for Just the 8th 
Time, Votes to Oust a Federal Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2010, at A27. 
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mendacious than Judge Ritter or Judge Claiborne’s income tax evasion. 
Although there are important distinctions between judicial 
impeachment and presidential impeachment, if the financially-related 
deceptions of previously impeached and convicted judges rise to the 
level of high crimes or misdemeanors, then Congress could reasonably 
conclude that President Trump’s alleged fraud and racketeering do as 
well. 
B. Settlement of the Trump University Civil Litigation Does Not 
Preclude Impeachment 
As a constitutional matter, it is of no consequence that the Trump 
University cases arose in civil litigation rather than criminal 
proceedings. Many crimes have a parallel civil claim that allows 
victims to seek compensation. Fraud and racketeering are, in this 
respect, ordinary. With respect to racketeering, Congress explained that 
it intended to provide for both criminal and civil sanctions because it 
wanted to provide “equitable relief broad enough to do all that is 
necessary to free the channels of commerce from illicit activity.”241 
The primary distinction between civil and criminal cases alleging fraud 
or racketeering is the standard of proof required. In a civil case alleging 
fraud or racketeering, the plaintiff must prove each element by a 
preponderance of the evidence.242 In a criminal case, the state must 
prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt.243 But in both types of 
cases, the underlying legal elements are the same. 
Moreover, the fact that President Trump has offered to settle with 
the plaintiffs in the Trump University cases, if anything, strengthens 
the legal case for impeachment. After the election, but prior to his 
inauguration, then-President-elect Trump reached a joint settlement 
agreement with both the attorneys in the class action cases and the New 
 
241 S. REP. NO. 91-617, at 79 (1969); see also G. Robert Blakey, The Rico Civil Fraud 
Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237, 348–49 
(1982) (arguing Congress intended an expansive reading of RICO in cases of fraud). 
242 See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
243 Although the Constitution is silent on this point, Congress has debated at length over 
what standard of proof is applicable to impeachment and removal proceedings. See 
generally THOMAS B. RIPY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-990A, STANDARDS OF PROOF IN 
SENATE IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS, passim (1999) (summarizing congressional debates 
over impeachment standards of proof). Charles Black explained this point: “Senators have 
no plainly authoritative guide in this matter, and ought not to be censured for the rule they 
conscientiously choose to act upon, after thought and counsel, and above all in total 
awareness of the dangers of partisanship or feelings of distaste.” BLACK, supra note 150, at 
17–18. 
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York Attorney General. Under the terms of the settlement, President 
Trump agreed to pay $25 million—$21 million going to settle the class 
action cases and $4 million to settle New York’s case.244 Although 
Judge Curiel confirmed the settlement agreement, one student objected 
to the proposed settlement and appealed to the Ninth Circuit demanding 
the right to proceed to trial individually.245 The legal issue for members 
of Congress contemplating impeachment and removal would be 
whether President Trump engaged in acts that constitute impeachment-
worthy high crimes or misdemeanors. If so, the settlement agreements 
of neither a state government nor private citizens have the legal power 
to extinguish Congress’s constitutional-impeachment rights. After all, 
the Constitution does not provide for impeachment “except in cases of 
settlement” or “unless the attorneys general of the states provide 
otherwise.”246 
On the contrary, the House of Representatives has the “sole” power 
of impeachment and the Senate has the “sole” power to try such 
impeachments.247 Of course Congress might consider the terms of 
settlement in deciding whether impeachment is appropriate, but 
Congress is not required to do so and in any event. The Trump 
University settlement is hardly exculpatory. President Trump agreed to 
the settlement after American voters were forced to cast their ballots. 
At the time of the election, voters did not know that the President would 
ultimately agree to pay a million dollar fine to the state of New York 
to settle the state’s fraud and consumer protection claims.248 Moreover, 
while President Trump did not admit to wrongdoing, agreeing to pay 
$25 million to avoid a jury trial is far more indicative of guilt than 
innocence. To this end, President Trump’s settlement of fraud and 
 
244 Order Granting Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement at 
*4–5, Low v. Trump Univ., LLC, No. 3:10-cv-00940-GPC-WVG (S.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2016), 
ECF No. 583. 
245 See generally Objector-Appellant’s Opening Brief, Low v. Trump University, LLC, 
No. 17-55635 (9th Cir. June 12, 2017), http://guptawessler.com/wp-content/uploads/2012 
/05/Trump-University-6.12-final.pdf; see also Sherri B. Simpson, Donald Trump Took 
$19,000 of my Money. And I Want Him to Pay, VOX (May 30, 2017, 8:00 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/first-person/2017/5/30/15693016/trump-university-settlement-law 
suit (first person column by objector-appellant explaining rationale for objecting to Trump’s 
settlement offer). 
246 U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2–3. 
247 Id. 
248 Steve Eder, Trump Settles University Suit for $25 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2016, 
at A1 (President Trump’s contingent agreement to settle the Trump University cases 
occurred ten days after the presidential election.). 
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racketeering allegations associated with Trump University could 
enhance the legal sufficiency of impeachment proceedings.249 
While President Trump was not indicted, impeachment proceedings 
have never required prior criminal conviction. Neither President 
Johnson nor President Clinton were convicted of crimes prior to their 
impeachment. And of the eight impeached and convicted federal 
judges, only one—Judge Claiborne—had a criminal conviction prior to 
his removal.250 Indeed, the Constitution explicitly separates 
impeachment from criminal prosecution.251 The breadth of the phrase 
“other high crimes and misdemeanors,” combined with the 
nonjusticabilty of impeachment, inevitably leaves much to the wisdom 
and judgment of the House of Representatives and the Senate.252 
Despite historical debate over what its meaning should be as a matter 
of law, it is clear that Congress would be well within its prerogative to 
impeach and remove a president for grave felonies of deception, such 
as fraud or racketeering. Congress has a constitutional right to insist 
upon a president who is not a fraudster or a racketeer as defined in its 
own laws. 
C. Under the U.S. Constitution, Impeachment Is Permissible for 
Preincumbency Offenses 
The plain language of the U.S. Constitution does not limit 
impeachable offenses to actions that take place while the official is in 
office. As Justice Scalia once explained, “[t]he words of a governing 
text are of paramount concern, and what they convey, in their context, 
 
249 It is worth noting that absent his settlement agreements, the civil lawsuits against 
Trump would have continued to proceed after he assumed office. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 
U.S. 681, 708–10 (1997) (holding the Constitution does not afford the President temporary 
immunity from cases seeking civil damages in litigation arising out of events that occurred 
before he took office). 
250 H.R. REP. NO. 99-688, at 22 (1986). 
251 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 (“Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further 
than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of Honor, 
Trust, or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable 
and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.”). This 
separation of impeachment from other judicial proceedings arose from an awareness of the 
long and bloody history of political tides in England. The Framers wanted criminal 
prosecution separate from the political act of removal from office through impeachment so 
“political passions no longer could sweep an accused to his death.” BERGER, supra note 148, 
at 55. 
252 Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 237–38 (1993). 
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is what the text means.”253 Similarly, the Supreme Court has long held 
that “[t]he framers of the [C]onstitution employed words in their 
natural sense; and, where they are plain and clear, resort to collateral 
aids to interpretation is unnecessary and cannot be indulged in to 
narrow or enlarge the text.”254 And more particularly, “[i]f the framers 
were minded to shield misconduct outside of office, they knew well 
enough how to limit undesirable facets of ‘high crimes and 
misdemeanors.’”255 For example, the framers could have used the 
phrase “corrupt, oppressive and other grave misconduct in office” 
instead of the particular phrase they chose.256 At the most simple level, 
the Constitution says that Congress may impeach and remove a 
president for “high crimes and misdemeanors,” not “high crimes and 
misdemeanors occurring in office.” 
This plain reading of the Constitution also reflects the framers’ 
rejection of George Mason’s proposal to permit impeachment for 
“maladministration”—an act that by its nature must occur while the 
official is in office.257 On this point, Madison argued that allowing 
impeachment for “so vague a term” as maladministration within office 
would place the tenure of the president at the “pleasure of the 
Senate.”258 Instead, the framers selected the still flexible, but more 
concrete, reference to “high crimes.”259 Moreover, George Mason 
himself also explicitly argued for the permissibility of impeachment 
during office for at least some forms of conduct that occurred prior to 
incumbency.260 At one point in the debate, Mason explained that 
impeachment for preincumbency offenses was necessary if dishonesty 
or corruption facilitated the President’s election. Otherwise, “the man 
who has practiced [sic] corruption & by that means procured his 
appointment in the first instance [would] be suffered to escape 
punishment, by repeating his guilt.”261 Although Mason was speaking 
 
253 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS 56 (2012). 
254 McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27 (1892). 
255 BERGER, supra note 148, at 197. 
256 Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
257 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 161, at 550; BERGER, supra note 148, at 78–79; 
Impeachment Inquiry Staff, Committee on the Judiciary of the U.S. House of 
Representatives, Constitutional Grounds for Presidential Impeachment, in PRESIDENTIAL 
IMPEACHMENT: A DOCUMENTARY OVERVIEW 1, 11–12 (M.B. Schnapper ed., 1974). 
258 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 161, at 550. 
259 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
260 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 161, at 65. 
261 Id. Gouverneur Morris also spoke in favor of permitting impeachment for a 
president’s preincumbent act of “[c]orrupting his electors.” Id. at 69. 
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of impeachment for preincumbency corruption connected to the 
President’s election, the point remains that in his view there was to be 
no jurisdictional bar to impeachment for offenses that occurred prior to 
inauguration. 
The U.S. Constitution’s impeachment provisions are distinguishable 
in this respect from impeachment provisions in many states. For 
example, the Virginia Constitution allows impeachment for “offending 
against the Commonwealth by malfeasance in office, corruption, 
neglect of duty, or other high crime or misdemeanor.”262 A plain 
reading of the Virginia Constitution suggests that any impeachable 
offense must be “against the commonwealth,” but only impeachment 
for malfeasance requires an offense while “in office.” 
In contrast, under the California Constitution, state officers and 
judges “are subject to impeachment for misconduct in office.”263 
Similarly, in Nebraska, “[a] civil officer . . . shall be liable to 
impeachment for any misdemeanor in office.”264 Nebraska courts have 
explained that preincumbency conduct is relevant and admissible in 
impeachment proceedings “to the extent it bears upon the officer’s 
pattern of conduct and shows the officer’s motives and intent as they 
relate to the officer’s conduct while in office.”265 Thus, California and 
Nebraska have adopted looser impeachment standards in the sense that 
they allow impeachment either for any misconduct in California or for 
any misdemeanor in Nebraska—instead of only for high crimes and 
misdemeanors. But, a plain reading shows that all three of these states 
are more strict than the Federal Constitution with respect to the time in 
which the misconduct must have occurred. 
While rare, state constitutional impeachment provisions have 
occasionally led to impeachment articles for preincumbency conduct. 
Perhaps the most notable instance of state-government impeachment 
for preincumbency conduct was the impeachment and conviction of 
New York Governor William Sulzer who ran into political trouble 
when he crossed Tammany Hall political bosses in the early twentieth 
century.266 Notably, the Sulzer articles of impeachment included 
allegations of filing false statements of campaign receipts and 
 
262 VA. CONST. art. IV, § 17. 
263 CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 18(b) (emphasis added). 
264 NEB. CONST. art. IV, § 5 (emphasis added). 
265 Nebraska Legislature ex rel. State v. Hergert, 720 N.W.2d 372, 391–92 (Neb. 2006). 
266 Mathew Lifflander, The Only New York Governor Ever Impeached, N.Y. ST. B.J., 
June 2013, at 10, 13. 
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expenditures prior to taking office.267 A month-long impeachment trial 
before the state Senate ultimately led to conviction of Governor Sulzer 
on three articles—two of which concerned preincumbency conduct.268 
More recently, in 2013, the Utah Legislature passed a resolution 
creating a special committee to investigate allegations against a sitting 
Utah Attorney General for preincumbency offenses that occurred while 
he was an unelected deputy attorney general.269 The Utah Constitution 
allows impeachment “for high crimes, misdemeanors, or malfeasance 
in office.”270 Presumably, the Utah legislature took the view that the 
words “in office” modified only malfeasance, otherwise an 
impeachment inquiry for preincumbency high crimes or misdemeanors 
would have been pointless. Ultimately the state Attorney General 
resigned before impeachment proceedings could remove him.271 
At the federal level, preincumbency offenses have played a part in 
the House of Representative’s impeachment deliberations for three vice 
presidents: John C. Calhoun, Schuyler Colfax, and Spiro Agnew. In 
1826, Vice President John C. Calhoun fell under suspicion of 
corruption in awarding war contracts during his prior service as 
Secretary of War. Although the alleged criminal activity predated his 
time as vice president, Calhoun himself requested that the House of 
Representatives consider impeachment in hopes of exoneration and the 
restoration of his reputation.272 
Acting on the request, the House of Representatives appointed a 
Select Committee to investigate the allegations.273 After issuing 
subpoenas and holding hearings, the Select Committee recommended 
against impeachment and the House declined to pursue the matter 
further.274 Nevertheless, the formation of a Select Committee, for the 
purpose of considering potential articles of impeachment, gives some 
 
267 1 Proceedings of the Court for the Trial of Impeachments: The People of the State of 
New York By the Assembly Thereof Against William Sulzer, as Governor (N.Y. 1913) 
[hereinafter Trial of William Sulzer]; John R. Dunne, Impeachment as a Political Weapon: 
The Case of Governor Sulzer, 6 JUD. NOTICE 31, 33 (2009). 
268 Trial of William Sulzer, supra note 267, at 1686, 1698, 1767–71 (recording guilty 
votes for Articles 1 and 2 relating to improper campaign expenditures and false affidavit). 
269 H.R. Res. 9001, 60th Leg., 1st H. Sess. (Utah 2013) (forming special investigative 
committee). 
270 UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 19. 
271 Robert Gehrke, Swallow Resigns, Proclaiming Innocence: ‘Time for the Madness to 
Stop,’ SALT LAKE TRIB. (Nov. 22, 2013, 12:13 PM), http://archive.sltrib.com/story.php 
?ref=/sltrib/home3/57163170-200/swallow-attorney-office-general.html.csp. 
272 HINDS, supra note 148, at 97–99. 
273 Id. at 98. 
274 COLE & GARVEY, supra note 228, at 16 n.137. 
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measure of precedent favoring the notion that impeachment for 
preincumbency conduct is permissible. If Vice President Calhoun was 
not subject to possible impeachment for preincumbency war 
profiteering, then no purpose would have been served by impaneling a 
Select Committee to investigate the allegations of corruption. 
A few decades later, the House Judiciary Committee took the 
position that impeachment was not appropriate for preincumbency 
conduct with respect to Vice President Schuyler Colfax. Prior to 
assuming the vice presidency alongside President Ulysses Grant, 
Schuyler Colfax served as Speaker of the House.275 Accusations were 
raised that Colfax had accepted stocks in exchange for taking political 
positions, favorable to the Union Pacific Railroad, during the 
construction of the transcontinental railroad.276 Like Vice President 
Calhoun, Vice President Colfax himself requested that the House 
consider whether impeachment or some further investigation was 
necessary.277 After a review of the limited American precedent, the 
House Judiciary Committee concluded that impeachment 
should only be applied to high crimes and misdemeanors committed 
while in office, and which alone affect the officer in discharge of his 
duties as such, whatever may have been their effect upon him as a 
man, for impeachment touches the office only, and qualifications for 
the office, and not the man himself.278 
However, as is often the case in bribery accusations, there were 
significant factual questions about whether Vice President Colfax had 
truly accepted a bribe in exchange for political acts.279 
It is possible that the House Judiciary committee merely used the 
preincumbency nature of the alleged offense as a method for 
sidestepping uncomfortable allegations against a former colleague of 
the same political party in a Congress still weary from the Johnson 
impeachment. Moreover, because Colfax had only a few months 
remaining in his term, Congress had little incentive to carefully 
consider impeachment. In any event, neither the House of 
Representatives as a whole, nor the Senate, had an opportunity to vote 
on articles of impeachment against Vice President Colfax. 
 
275 See generally O.J. HOLLISTER, LIFE OF SCHUYLER COLFAX (1886). 
276 William MacDonald, Schuyler Colfax, in 4 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 
297, 298 (Allen Johnson & Dumas Malone eds., 1930). 
277 COLE & GARVEY, supra note 228, at 16 n.137. 
278 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 3d Sess. 1652 (1873). 
279 HOLLISTER, supra note 275, at 417. 
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On the other hand, the 1973 resignation of Vice President Spiro 
Agnew lends some support to the viability of impeachment for 
preincumbency offenses. Prior to serving as Richard Nixon’s vice 
president, Spiro Agnew served as governor of Maryland and as 
Baltimore County Executive. A federal probe into Maryland 
construction contract corruption uncovered several businessmen who 
confessed to making cash payments to Agnew while he worked for 
Baltimore County, as Governor of Maryland, and as Vice President.280 
As news of the alleged bribes leaked to the press, President Nixon 
pressured Vice President Agnew to resign because Nixon—who was 
facing the growing threat of the Watergate scandal—believed “if a vice 
president were to be impeached, it might then seem all the easier to 
impeach a president.”281 
Vice President Agnew struck a plea bargain in which he agreed to 
resign and offer a nolo contendere plea to one count of tax evasion in 
exchange for the Justice Department’s recommendation against prison 
time.282 Agnew’s resignation, sentence to three years of probation, and 
$10,000 fine forestalled impeachment proceedings.283 Nevertheless, 
the fact that Agnew resigned the vice presidency under threat of 
impeachment for offenses that occurred primarily, but not exclusively, 
prior to his term in federal office suggests that his advisors believed 
that the threat of impeachment and conviction were credible. 
Two federal judicial impeachments also provide support for the view 
that preincumbency offenses can provide a basis for impeachment and 
removal. First, in 1913, the House impeached, and the Senate 
convicted, Third Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Robert Archbald for 
offenses relating to bribery and corruption in office.284 However, some 
of the illegal actions occurred before his appointment to the Third 
Circuit, while he was still serving as a federal district court judge.285 
Counsel for Judge Archbald argued that impeachment should not be 
permissible for any acts committed prior to the official’s current office 
lest the “far-reaching” and “absurd” result that presidents could be 
 
280 KYVIG, supra note 200, at 129–30. 
281 JULES WITCOVER, VERY STRANGE BEDFELLOWS: THE SHORT AND UNHAPPY 
MARRIAGE OF RICHARD NIXON AND SPIRO AGNEW 314 (2007). Notably, like Calhoun and 
Colfax, Vice President Agnew formally requested an impeachment investigation by the 
House of Representatives believing that this might provide a viable political route to 
preventing a grand jury indictment. Id. at 330. 
282 KYVIG, supra note 200, at 139. 
283 Id. 
284 Individuals Impeached, supra note 197. 
285 COLE & GARVEY, supra note 228, at 15. 
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impeached and removed for offenses in their distant past.286 
Responding to this point, the managers of Judge Archbald’s Senate trial 
argued: 
This right to inquire into the conduct of public officials has been 
reserved to the people themselves, and this great Senate is the tribunal 
in which such questions must be tried, and necessarily and properly 
the powers of this court are broad, strong, and elastic so that all 
misconduct may be investigated and the public service purified. The 
fathers of the Constitution realized the importance of reserving unto 
the people the right to remove an unworthy or unsatisfactory official, 
and they were indeed wise in not attempting to define or limit the 
powers of the court of impeachment, but left that power so plenary 
that no misconduct on the part of a public official might escape its 
just punishment.287 
The managers also relied on several early state impeachments for 
offenses that occurred during prior offices.288 Ultimately, the Senate 
convicted Judge Archbald on multiple articles, including one article 
relating in part to conduct that occurred during his prior judgeship.289 
Second, the House impeached, and the Senate convicted, Judge 
Thomas Porteous in 2010 in part for offenses that occurred before he 
held any federal office.290 Two impeachment articles against Judge 
Porteous involved offenses committed both while he was a federal 
judge and prior to his appointment when he was serving as a state court 
judge.291 An additional article of impeachment, focusing on 
misrepresentations Judge Porteous made to the Senate during his 
confirmation process, occurred entirely before his term in office. 
Relying on Professor Michael Gerhardt, the House Judiciary 
Committee impeachment report made a plain, textual argument to 
justify impeachment of Judge Porteous on the basis of preincumbency 
conduct: “the Constitution describes certain types of conduct for which 
 
286 6 CLARENCE CANNON, CANNON’S PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES § 458, at 642 (1935). 
287 Id. at 639 (internal quotations omitted). 
288 See id. (noting New York’s impeachment of Justice George Gardner Butler Barnard, 
Wisconsin’s impeachment of Judge Levi Hubbell, and Nebraska’s impeachment of 
Governor David Butler). See also 1 ROGER FOSTER, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, HISTORICAL AND JURIDICAL, WITH 
OBSERVATIONS UPON THE ORDINARY PROVISIONS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND A 
COMPARISON WITH THE CONSTITUTIONS OF OTHER COUNTRIES § 92, at 579 (1895) (“State 
senates have sustained articles of impeachment for offenses committed at previous and 
immediately preceding terms of the same or similar office.”). 
289 COLE & GARVEY, supra note 228, at 15. 
290 Individuals Impeached, supra note 197. 
291 H.R. REP. NO. 111-427, at 2–5 (2010). 
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impeachment is warranted (‘Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors’), ‘it does not say when the misconduct must have been 
committed.’”292 Taking the example of a preincumbency murder, the 
impeachment report explained, that “[t]he timing of the murder is of 
less concern that the fact of it; this is the kind of behavior that is 
completely incompatible with the public trust invested in officials who 
are sufficiently high-ranking to be subject to the impeachment 
process.”293 After considerable debate, the Senate convicted Judge 
Porteous on all articles—including the exclusively preincumbency 
conduct article relating to deception of the Senate during his 
confirmation.294 
Arguably, Judge Porteous’ conduct is distinguishable from President 
Trump’s alleged fraud and racketeering in two respects. First, at the 
time of these preincumbency offenses, he was serving as a state judge, 
which is nonetheless a form of public office. Second, the entirely 
preincumbency impeachment article against him had a nexus with a 
federal office in that his deceptions were made in the confirmation 
process itself. However, with respect to the former, it is not clear what 
textual or policy support would justify ignoring preincumbency 
treason, bribery or other high crimes or misdemeanors simply because 
the officer previously worked as a businessman rather than a public 
servant. These offenses are wrong for everyone—not just government 
officials. The text of our Constitution does not absurdly provide 
impeachment for “high crimes and misdemeanors except in cases of 
business or profit.”295 
More important than when the offense occurred is whether the 
offense is so sufficiently grave that it imperils the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of the office holder. The same can be said with respect to 
the latter argument. Surely, a fraud against the Senate’s confirmation 
process suggests untrustworthiness, but are frauds upon widows or 
orphans somehow better than those upon senators? It is certainly true 
that precedent favoring impeachment for preincumbency conduct is 
rare. But, this may have more to do with the reluctance of the public to 
elect, or the president to nominate, those under suspicion of high crimes 
or misdemeanors than it has to do with any legal hurdle to conviction. 
In more typical election years, the public can generally be relied upon 
to vote against fraudsters and racketeers. 
 
292 Id. at 19 (emphasis added) (citing written statement of Prof. Michael J. Gerhardt). 
293 Id. 
294 COLE & GARVEY, supra note 228, at 15. 
295 Cf. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
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But this hints at what is likely the strongest argument against the 
legality of the impeachment of President Trump for fraud and 
racketeering in connection with Trump University. Namely, that the 
election would, in effect, serve as a referendum on whether 
impeachment is appropriate. A related argument might be that 
impeachment for preincumbency conduct would allow the House of 
Representatives to supplant the electoral college even where there was 
no electoral tie. These arguments are compelling because of the 
tremendous importance of the single, national election of a president in 
the political and cultural life of the republic. No Congress has ever 
impeached and removed a president from office. To do so following an 
election would be an extraordinary and unprecedented step with 
momentous implications for the nation. 
Nevertheless, there are at least five arguments why the election 
would not, as a matter of law, preclude President Trump’s 
impeachment and removal. First, the plain language of the Constitution 
reserves the rights of impeachment to the House and removal to the 
Senate.296 These rights, like many others, are not provided to the public 
in our representative form of government. If the country elects a 
president that has committed bribery, treason, or other high crimes or 
misdemeanors, then it risks that the efficacy of their votes may be 
impeded through impeachment and removal by its own elected 
representatives. We can expect this to be as rare in the future as it has 
been in the past because the public will still generally vote against 
candidates with a track record of impeachable offenses. After all, we 
have no reason to believe that impeachment and removal of one 
president will somehow embolden the public to vote more often for 
candidates under suspicion of high crimes. And, if representatives and 
senators were to concoct false or unpersuasive charges, they 
themselves would be subject to ouster in their next elections for having 
flouted the public will. Although Congress’ legal power of 
preincumbency impeachment is recondite, it nonetheless remains: the 
U.S. House and Senate may impeach and remove a president that has 
committed bribery, treason, or other high crimes or misdemeanors—an 
election notwithstanding. 
Second, unlike the House of Representatives’ sole role in resolving 
electoral college ties, impeachment and removal requires action by 
both the House and the Senate. By contrast, the Senate has no role in 
electoral college ties. This suggests that impeachment is simply a 
 
296 U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2–3. 
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separate and unrelated proceeding, not connected to the House’s 
electoral tiebreaker role. The Constitution does not appear to have a 
mechanism that limits impeachment proceedings other than the elusive, 
yet high, substantive standard of treason, bribery, or other high crimes 
and misdemeanors. Thus, the Constitution’s impeachment and removal 
procedures are distinct from and coequal to the Constitution’s electoral 
procedures. 
Third, President Trump’s public misrepresentation of the facts and 
circumstances surrounding his alleged fraud and racketeering should 
weigh in the calculus over whether impeachment for preincumbency 
crimes is appropriate. Just as President Trump appears to have lied to 
Trump University students, throughout the election he also 
misrepresented the Trump University cases. Specifically, in a widely 
viewed presidential debate, President Trump falsely claimed that 
Trump University had an A rating from the BBB.297 In fact, the wealth 
seminars had a D- rating during the relevant time period.298 Every 
nonpartisan fact checking organization that explored the issue, as well 
as the BBB itself, concluded that President Trump misrepresented the 
BBB rating in the debate.299 
Moreover, during the election campaign, President Trump falsely 
claimed that the New York Attorney General’s case was politically 
motivated.300 In fact, not only did the state of New York file the case 
long before the 2016 presidential campaign began, but the state of New 
York’s Trump University case developed out of the bright-line 
licensing statute violations that had been raised by New York 
authorities nearly five years prior to the lawsuit. 
Most notably, when President Trump suffered setbacks in the private 
class action cases, he publicly criticized a widely respected judge, 
 
297 See, e.g., Eugene Kiely, Trump University’s D- Rating, FACTCHECK.ORG (Mar. 8, 
2016), http://www.factcheck.org/2016/03/trump-universitys-d-rating/ (“[W]hat Trump 
literally holds out as evidence is meaningless and misleading.”); Jon Greenberg, Fact-
checking Donald Trump’s claims about Trump University, POLITIFACT (Feb. 28, 2106, 6:42 
PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2016/feb/28/donald-trump /fact-
checking-donald-trumps-claims-about-trump-uni/ (“Trump’s claim is literally wrong and 
also ignores the university’s lower Better Business Bureau scores. We rate it False.”). 
298 Greenberg, supra note 297. 
299 Id.; Kiely, supra note 297. 
300 Eliza Collins, A Complicated History: Trump and N.Y. Attorney General Eric 
Schneiderman, USA TODAY (Sept. 14, 2016, 3:54 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story 
/news/politics/onpolitics/2016/09/14/complicated-history-trump-and-ny-attorney-general    
-eric-schneiderman/90353238/. 
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claiming it was the judge’s Mexican heritage that caused his losses.301 
In fact, a professional reading of the litigation history shows evidence 
of a sustained pattern of deception by President Trump, which provided 
an ample record upon which the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of California justifiably denied President Trump’s motion for 
summary judgment.302 From this attack on the racial heritage of a 
sitting federal judge, Congress could reasonably conclude that this 
attack on the racial heritage of a sitting federal judge created a 
distraction that obfuscated the ability of the public to clearly internalize 
the gravity of President Trump’s alleged deceptions. Perhaps if 
President Trump had apologized and accepted responsibility for his 
alleged fraud and racketeering, then the argument that the election 
served as an effective referendum on the appropriateness of 
impeachment would be more persuasive. 
Instead the Trump campaign attempted to deflect blame and tarnish 
the reputations of individuals involved in the cases brought against him. 
President Trump’s deception on this point bears some comparison to 
the House Judiciary Committee’s vote to impeach President Nixon, in 
part, because of his false public statements regarding the scope of an 
investigation into illegal activity.303 As it stands, President Trump’s 
own representations regarding the case may have distorted the public 
view of whether President Trump committed fraud or racketeering. 
Similar to the confirmation process fraud of Judge Porteous and the 
campaign expenditure disclosure violations of Governor Sulzer, 
President Trump misrepresented his alleged crimes in a way that helped 
him acquire his office. This is to say, President Trump obtained his 
office, in some measure, through deceiving the public about his 
involvement with Trump University. Under these circumstances, 
members of Congress could reasonably argue that President Trump 
should be estopped from claiming that the election precludes his 
impeachment because his misrepresentations interfered with the 
public’s opportunity to determine whether his fraud and racketeering 
was disqualifying. 
 
301 Jia Tolentino, Trump and the Truth: The “Mexican” Judge, NEW YORKER (Sept. 20, 
2016), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/trump-and-the-truth-the-mexican   -
judge. 
302 Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 145 F. Supp. 3d 962, 980–81 (S.D. Cal. 2015). 
303 The House Judiciary committee specifically recommended impeachment for “making 
false or misleading public statements for the purpose of deceiving the people of the United 
States into believing that a thorough and complete investigation had been conducted with 
respect to allegations of misconduct. . . .” H.R. REP. NO. 93-1305, supra note 214, at 2, art. 
I, § 8. 
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Fourth, Congress could reasonably conclude that President Trump’s 
delay tactics in the Trump University litigation justify an exception 
allowing impeachment for preincumbency conduct. The Trump 
University cases were pending for over six years. In the months before 
the election, President Trump’s legal team explicitly advocated to delay 
his trial in Low v. Trump University until after the election.304 This 
strategy succeeded in depriving the public of the benefit of the judicial 
system’s clear view on whether President Trump engaged in fraud and 
racketeering. 
Now, it is unfair to allow delay tactics to prevent both the public and 
Congress from having the opportunity to definitively resolve the fraud 
and racketeering allegations. Akin to laches, Congress could conclude 
that impeachment proceedings for preincumbency conduct are justified 
in this unusual instance because President Trump’s lack of diligence in 
the timely defense of himself prejudiced voters by denying them 
relevant fact finding at the time when it would have made a 
difference.305 Congress could conclude that through his own litigation 
strategy, President Trump has placed Congress—rather than the courts 
or the public—in an adjudicative role. What should be constitutionally 
unacceptable is an outcome where neither the public nor the Congress 
have a full opportunity to determine whether President Trump’s alleged 
crimes are disqualifying. Members of Congress could reasonably 
conclude that President Trump should not be allowed to procedurally 
foreclose impeachment simply because he successfully delayed 
judicial resolution of his alleged fraud and racketeering until after the 
election. 
Finally, President Trump’s loss of the popular vote blunts the claim 
that the election should preclude impeachment of President Trump. 
President Trump won the election by amassing 304 out of 538 electoral 
college votes.306 By winning 56.88% of the available electoral college 
 
304 See Transcript of Final Pretrial Conference Before the Honorable Gonzalo P. Curiel 
United States District Judge at 9–11, Low v. Trump Univ., LLC, No. 3:10-cv-00940-GPC-
WVG (S.D. Cal. May 6, 2016), ECF No. 512-2 (President Trump’s counsel arguing: “I don’t 
believe there is any compelling reason, given that the case is already six years old, why it 
has to be tried now, particularly given the effects that it could have on the election process.”). 
305 The equitable doctrine of laches generally requires “(1) lack of diligence by the party 
against whom the defense is asserted, and (2) prejudice to the party asserting the defense.” 
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 (2002) (quoting Kansas v. 
Colorado 514 U.S. 673, 687 (1995)). 
306 Ed O’Keefe, With Electoral College Vote, Trump’s Win is Official, WASH. POST 
(Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/the-electoral-college-is-poised  -
to-pick-trump-despite-push-to-dump-him/2016/12/19/75265c16-c58f-11e6-85b5-76616a 
33048d_story.html?utm_term=.4b7fbd13e77e. 
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votes, President Trump’s margin of victory ranks in the bottom quarter 
of all electoral college margins in American History—below Martin 
Van Buren, James Garfield, and Harry Truman.307 President Trump’s 
leading opponent received nearly three million more votes than 
President Trump.308 While the Constitution uses the Electoral College 
system to legally select a president, nothing prevents Congress from 
considering the strength of the President’s popular mandate in 
exercising its impeachment discretion.309 It is a central tenant of our 
Constitution that consent of the public is a constitutionally meaningful 
value.310 Indeed, it was a foundational insight of the American republic 
that governments “deriv[e] their just powers from the consent of the 
governed.”311 As Madison explained during the Constitutional 
Convention, “[t]he people [are] in fact, the fountain of all power.”312 
Thus, although not dispositive, it is nonetheless persuasive that more 
of “[w]e the people” voted for a different candidate than voted for 
President Trump.313 If all people “are created equal,” then the 
President’s popular vote loss is meaningful.314 A larger number of our 
equally-created citizens voted against the President than for him. In 
normal presidencies, presidential impeachment is exceptionally 
difficult because “[t]o remove a president is, in effect, to declare that 
the voters made a bad choice in electing him, and that is not an easy 
message for other elected politicians to convey.”315 This message is 
easier to convey when a large majority of the voters did not actually 
choose to elect him. Congress could reasonably conclude that this fact 
 
307 Louis Jacobson, Donald Trump’s Electoral College Victory Was Not a ‘Massive 
Landslide,’ POLITIFACT (Dec. 12, 2016, 4:41 PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o         -
meter/statements/2016/dec/12/donald-trump/donald-trumps-electoral-college-victory-was -
not-ma/. 
308 Presidential Results, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/election/results/president (last 
visited Oct. 18, 2017). President Trump has repeatedly asserted, without evidence, that three 
to five million illegal immigrants voted in the election. This is false. See Michael D. Shear 
& Emmarie Huetteman, Meeting With Top Lawmakers, Trump Repeats an Election Lie, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2017, at A1; Nicholas Fandos, Truth Behind a Lie on Voting Fraud, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2017, at A13. 
309 U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XXIII. 
310 Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment 
Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 458–59 (1994) (arguing that the consent of the 
government principle would justify constitutional amendments on the basis of bare national 
majority). 
311 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
312 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 161, at 475. 
313 U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
314 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
315 LABOVITZ, supra note 209, at 257. 
PETERSON (DO NOT DELETE) 12/14/2017  8:05 PM 
2017] Trump University and Presidential Impeachment 113 
is constitutionally relevant to consider in the exercise of its 
impeachment discretion. 
Of course our system relies primarily on fixed, periodic elections to 
resolve political differences. In all but the most extraordinary cases, 
bad behavior by a president has a four-year shelf life. Our founders 
never intended for impeachment to be a tool used to remove officers or 
judges with whom Congress simply has policy disagreements. 
Nevertheless, the founders also did not establish an impeachment 
standard either so high or so procedurally picayune that destructive or 
corrupt executives could not be removed from office in times of great 
necessity. By electing a president that faced unresolved, triable 
accusations of fraud and racketeering, the public voted for a shortly-
leashed president. That is, the best combined reading of the 
Constitution’s electoral college and impeachment provisions is that—
in 2016—the public narrowly voted for a congressionally revocable 
presidency. 
IV 
THE CONGRESSIONAL DUTY OF OVERSIGHT: TOWARD AN 
IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY 
The Trump administration and its supporters have raised a number 
of political and legal responses to the possibility of impeachment. 
Among these arguments, the administration and its supporters have 
pointed to the need for the country to rally together and unify around 
its democratically elected leader in order to solve pressing problems.316 
Talk of impeachment in this view ignores the will and judgment of 
millions of Americans that believe in President Trump’s campaign 
promise to “make America great again.” From their perspective, 
looking backward at the President’s troubled wealth seminars would be 
counterproductive and unhelpful in moving forward with the 
President’s national agenda. 
On the other hand, in the American constitutional system, Congress 
has an obligation to carefully consider allegations of unlawful or 
unconstitutional conduct by a president. Under normal circumstances, 
the executive branch of government enforces American law, drawing 
on the judicial branch to interpret the law and adjudicate disputes. But 
the constitution provides a special law enforcement role for Congress 
 
316 David Jackson, Trump’s Aim in His Inaugural Address: National Unity, USA TODAY 
(Jan. 17, 2017, 12:34 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elec 
tions/2017/01/17/donald-trump-inaugural-address/96643974/. 
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when individuals in the executive branch or the judiciary itself have 
violated laws that rise to the level of impeachable offenses.317 
Although rare, the Constitution gives Congress this law enforcement 
duty as a safeguard against the abuse of power. Hamilton called this 
“partial intermixture” of the normal separation of powers “necessary to 
the mutual defense of the several members of the government against 
each other.”318 With respect to impeachable offenses committed by 
federal officers, including federal judges, the vice president, and 
especially the president, the House of Representatives takes on the role 
of national law enforcement agency and the Senate a judicial role. 
Thus, 
The division of them between the two branches of the legislature, 
assigning to one the right of accusing, to the other the right of 
judging, avoids the inconvenience of making the same persons both 
accusers and judges; and guards against the danger of persecution, 
from the prevalency of a factious spirit in either of those branches.319 
Like prosecutors in the executive branch, when plausible allegations 
of impeachable offenses committed by the president arise, the United 
States House of Representatives, and following past practices the 
House Judiciary Committee in particular, has a constitutional duty to 
investigate.320 The text of the Constitution is phrased in the imperative, 
requiring that “The President . . . shall be removed from Office on 
Impeachment for, and Conviction of . . . other high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors.”321 Noting this, Professor Stephen Presser has 
explained, “[t]he oath each member of Congress takes to uphold the 
Constitution requires him or her to make that determination for him or 
herself, because the maintenance of the quality of the executive that the 
constitutional structure demands is part of his or her job.”322 The House 
of Representatives has a crucial “accusatory function” in providing a 
 
317 Jonathan Turley, Congress as Grand Jury: The Role of the House of Representatives 
in the Impeachment of an American President, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 735, 778 (1999). 
318 THE FEDERALIST NO. 66 (Alexander Hamilton). 
319 Id. 
320 See, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. H24,685 (1998) (statement of Representative Chabot 
arguing in favor of investigating President Clinton’s alleged deception relating to a marital 
affair, “I would urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to rise above the partisan fires 
that too often burn in our Nation’s capital. Consider the facts at hand and fulfill our 
constitutional responsibilities by moving forward with a fair and thorough investigation of 
this important matter.”). 
321 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (emphasis added). 
322 Stephen B. Presser, Would George Washington Have Wanted Bill Clinton 
Impeached?, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 666, 676 (1999) (emphasis omitted). 
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check against executive crime.323 For the House Judiciary Committee 
to not hold hearings or issue subpoenas, and otherwise neglect to gather 
any evidence at all when a federal judge has already found triable 
allegations that the President committed fraud and racketeering, risks 
straining the credibility of the House as a law enforcement body with 
respect to its impeachment duties. Under our most basic law, the House 
Judiciary Committee, or perhaps an alternative select committee, is 
obliged to set aside partisanship and conduct a credible factual and 
legal inquiry into impeachable offenses.324 
Throughout the history of federal impeachment, the House of 
Representatives has typically drawn up impeachment articles that 
identify multiple offenses, often arising out of distinct and separate 
wrongdoings. While the Constitution only requires one offense of 
bribery, treason, or another high crime or misdemeanor for removal, as 
a practical matter Congress has been more likely to act when it 
identifies patterns of offenses. For example, although the House 
Judiciary Committee ultimately voted against recommending the 
impeachment of President Nixon for concealing the war in Cambodia, 
this scandal likely helped build momentum and pave the way for later 
congressional action.325 Similarly, in the impeachment and removal of 
Judge Porteous, it was a combination of his preincumbency deception, 
his receipt of cash from lawyers with pending cases, and his use of a 
false name to elude, that created what his articles of impeachment 
called a “pattern of conduct inconsistent with the trust and confidence 
placed in him . . . .”326 
In this respect, Congress and the public should view the alleged 
Trump University fraud and racketeering in the context of a pattern of 
other serious allegations. While exploring each of these ongoing 
controversies in detail is beyond the scope of this Article, the Trump 
University fraud and racketeering allegations can only be understood 
alongside at least five other alleged impeachable offenses. First, sixteen 
federal intelligence agencies have concluded that the Russian 
government hacked the computer files of the Democratic National 
 
323 Turley, supra note 317. 
324 In early impeachments, the House often appointed a select committee. The Judiciary 
committee has handled impeachment proceedings since its establishment as a permanent 
standing committee in 1813. See Firmage & Mangrum, supra note 221, at 1037. 
325 H.R. REP. NO. 93-1305, supra note 214, at 38–39. 
326 H.R. REP. NO. 111-427, at 3 (2010). 
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Committee.327 Intelligence agency leaks, email correspondence by the 
President’s closest aides, as well as one of President Trump’s own 
campaign speeches, have raised troubling suspicion that President 
Trump colluded with the Russian government to interfere in the 2016 
presidential election.328 If true, Congress could reasonably draw an 
analogy to President Nixon’s participation in, and cover up of, the 
burglary of the Democratic National Committee’s files at the Watergate 
Hotel,329 as well as the 1789 impeachment proceedings against Senator 
William Blount for conspiracy to aid a foreign power.330 Second, 
former White House ethics lawyers have argued that President Trump 
is also violating the foreign emoluments clause by allowing his 
business interests to profit from foreign governments seeking to curry 
favor with the administration.331 Third, President Trump’s refusal to 
divest his business interests appears to be facilitating additional 
compensation to him from the U.S. Treasury in a potential violation of 
 
327 Eugene Kiely, Trump, Russia and the U.S. Election, FACTCHECK.ORG (Dec. 8, 2016), 
http://www.factcheck.org/2016/12/trump-russia-u-s-election/. 
328 Michael S. Schmidt, Mark Mazzetti & Matt Apuzzo, Trump Aides Had Contact with 
Russian Intelligence, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2017, at A1; Matt Apuzzo et al., Trump’s Son 
Heard of Link to Moscow Before Meeting, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2017, at A1; see also 
Michael Crowley & Tyler Pager, Trump Urges Russia to Hack Clinton’s Email, POLITICO 
(July 27, 2016, 5:17 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/trump-putin-no-relation 
ship-226282 (“I will tell you this, Russia: If you’re listening, I hope you’re able to find the 
30,000 emails that are missing . . . . I think you will probably be rewarded mightily by our 
press.”). 
329 H.R. REP. NO. 93-1305, supra note 214, at 2. 
330 Facing personal financial problems, Senator William Blount of Tennessee joined with 
British officers in a conspiracy to assist Great Britain’s plans to conquer parts of Spanish, 
Florida, and Louisiana. BUCKNER F. MELTON, JR., THE FIRST IMPEACHMENT: THE 
CONSTITUTION’S FRAMERS AND THE CASE OF SENATOR WILLIAM BLOUNT 89–103 (1998). 
When a letter detailing the conspiracy came to light, the House of Representatives voted to 
impeach Senator Blount in its earliest impeachment proceeding. See id. at 116–126. In a 
Senate trial an extensive debate ensued over whether Senators were subject to impeachment 
proceedings. Ultimately the Senate concluded it did not have jurisdiction over its own 
members, but voted to expel Blount from the Senate by a two-thirds majority. Firmage & 
Mangum, supra note 221, at 1090. In the Constitutional Convention Madison argued one of 
the principal reasons for impeachment was to guard against the possibility that the President 
“might betray his trust to foreign powers.” FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 161, at 66. 
331 NORMAN L. EISEN, RICHARD PAINTER & LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE EMOLUMENTS 
CLAUSE: ITS TEXT, MEANING, AND APPLICATION TO DONALD J. TRUMP 22 (Brookings 
2016), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-emoluments-clause-its-text-meaning-and-
application-to-donald-j-trump/ (arguing Congress has “a plainly valid basis under the 
Constitution for concluding [President Trump] cannot serve in office—both as a matter of 
first principles and given evidence that at least one prominent leader in the ratification 
process saw violations of this Clause as grounds for impeachment.”). 
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the domestic emoluments clause.332 Congress could reasonably 
conclude that violations of both the foreign and domestic emoluments 
clauses constitute impeachable high misdemeanors.333 
Fourth, unlike any president in recent memory, President Trump has 
refused to release his tax returns despite the largest White House 
petition drive in American history.334 This refusal, in the face of the 
public’s persistent demands, raises a suspicion of illegal tax evasion. 
Tax fraud has been one of the most common offenses in past 
impeachment proceedings, including the impeachment and removal of 
Judge Halstad Ritter in 1936 and Judge Harry E. Claiborne in 1986,335 
as well as the Vice President Agnew’s resignation in 1973.336 And 
fifth, President Trump was recorded boasting about a pattern of past 
sexual assaults.337 The President’s own taped admission of “grabbing” 
a woman is corroborated by at least seventeen women who have 
publicly accused him of unwanted sexual assault, groping, or 
harassment.338 As a result of the 2009 impeachment of Judge Samuel 
Kent, the House of Representatives already determined that sexual 
 
332 U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 7 (“The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his 
Services, a Compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the Period 
for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that Period any other 
Emolument from the United States, or any of them.”). 
333 During the Constitutional Convention, John F. Mercer from Maryland explained the 
policy of the constitutional emoluments prohibitions: 
It is a first principle in political science, that whenever the rights of property are 
secured, an aristocracy will grow out of it. Elective Governments also necessarily 
become aristocratic, because the rulers being few can & will draw emoluments for 
themselves from the many. The Governments of America will become 
aristocracies. They are so already. The public measures are calculated for the 
benefit of the Governors, not of the people. The people are dissatisfied & complain. 
They change their rulers, and the public measures are changed, but it is only a 
change of one scheme of emolument to the rulers, for another. The people gain 
nothing by it . . . . 
FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 161, at 284; see also EISEN, PAINTER & TRIBE, supra 
note 331, at 5 (discussing ratifying convention statements of Edmund Jennings Randolph 
describing emoluments violations as subject to impeachment). 
334 Max Greenwood, Petition for Trump’s Tax Returns gets Record Number of 
Signatures, THE HILL (Jan. 26, 2017, 4:49 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing        -
room/news/316382-petition-demanding-trumps-tax-returns-gets-record-number-of. 
335 See supra Table 1. 
336 KYVIG, supra note 200, at 139. 
337 Transcript: Donald Trump’s Taped Comments About Women, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/08/us/donald-trump-tape-transcript.html. 
338 Libby Nelson & Sarah Frostenson, A Brief Guide to the 17 Women Trump has 
Allegedly Assaulted, Groped or Harassed, VOX (Oct. 20, 2016, 3:14 PM), http://www.vox 
.com/2016/10/13/13269448/trump-sexual-assault-allegations. 
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groping—strikingly similar to the type President Trump himself said 
he has engaged in—constitutes a high crime or misdemeanor.339 
While each of these allegations raises troubling questions, President 
Trump’s actions in connection with Trump University are distinct in an 
important respect—a federal judge appointed under Article III of the 
Constitution has already held that the evidence of fraud and 
racketeering in the Trump University cases are sufficiently credible to 
merit a full jury trial in a court of law. The President agreed to pay $25 
million dollars to avoid these jury trials. For Congress to ignore these 
serious indicia of potentially criminal activity sends an unacceptable 
message of indifference to the alleged victims of Trump University. 
Politics aside, the Trump University students are real families with 
stories of suffering, loss, and frustration. Individually, these families, 
as well as the State of New York, have accused the President of 
conducting a nationwide, fraudulent marketing campaign for a personal 
coaching scam. Congress must acknowledge them, listen to their 
stories, and consider the legal implications of these alleged crimes or it 
will fail to carry out its constitutional duty. 
For his part, President Trump and his advisors should follow the lead 
of Vice Presidents John C. Calhoun and Shuyler Colfax, both of whom 
formally requested impeachment inquiries by the House of 
Representatives in an effort to exonerate themselves.340 If President 
Trump believes that he is innocent of the allegations against him, then 
he should welcome a congressional investigation. He expressed a 
similar point after reaching a settlement agreement in the Trump 
 
339 Compare Transcript: Donald Trump’s Taped Comments About Women, supra note 
337 (“I did try and fuck her. She was married. . . . I moved on her very heavily. . . . I moved 
on her like a bitch. . . . I better use some Tic Tacs just in case I start kissing her. You know, 
I’m automatically attracted to beautiful—I just start kissing them. It’s like a magnet. Just 
kiss. I don’t even wait. And when you’re a star, they let you do it. You can do anything. . . . 
Grab ‘em by the pussy. You can do anything.”), with H.R. REP. NO. 111-159, at 2 (2009) 
(“Samuel B. Kent has engaged in conduct with respect to employees associated with the 
court that is incompatible with the trust and confidence placed in him as a judge, as follows 
. . . . On one or more occasions between 2003 and 2007, Judge Kent sexually assaulted Cathy 
McBroom, by touching her private areas directly and through her clothing against her will 
and by attempting to cause her to engage in a sexual act with him. Wherefore, Judge Samuel 
B. Kent is guilty of high crimes and misdemeanors and should be removed from office.”). 
Judge Kent tendered a resignation letter from prison just as his Senate trial was set to begin. 
See Lise Olsen, Embattled Kent Resigns, Effective Tuesday, HOUS. CHRON. (June 25, 2009, 
5:30 AM), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas /article/Embattled-Kent-resigns-
effective-Tuesday-1731302.php. 
340 COLE & GARVEY, supra note 228, at 16 n.137. 
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University civil litigation, noting his disappointment that the agreement 
would deny him the opportunity to vindicate himself in a jury trial.341 
If the House fails to investigate the allegations of impeachable 
offenses against President Trump it will further deprive the President 
of the opportunity to present his side of the story in not only the Trump 
University case, but the other allegations against him as well. In 
particular, an investigation by the House of Representatives into 
alleged Trump University fraud and racketeering would provide an 
alternative to the trial President Trump indicated that he wanted. 
Supporters of the President should also consider welcoming an 
impeachment inquiry early in the President’s administration. So long 
as the cloud of impeachment hangs over the administration, trust and 
legitimacy issues will continue to face the President and will impede 
his ability to build coalitions necessary for healthy and vibrant 
governance. President Trump should send a formal request for an 
impeachment inquiry in an effort to restore his reputation and exonerate 
himself. 
CONCLUSION 
At the very core of President Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign 
was his simple insight that Americans feel they are “being ripped off 
by everyone.”342 President Trump’s message resonated with millions 
who felt, and continue to feel, that the government, Wall Street, and 
even cultural leaders are not acting in the best interests of ordinary, 
working families. His campaign themes of “draining the swamp” in our 
nation’s capital and “making America great again” were, in effect, a 
campaign promise to systemically renegotiate a new deal on behalf of 
the public. 
However, President Trump’s track record with respect to Trump 
University is deeply in tension with this promise. If Americans are 
being ripped off by everyone, then some of them were especially ripped 
off by Donald Trump’s Trump University. The evidence assembled 
through over six years of litigation could lead reasonable people to 
 
341 Doug Stanglin, Trump Tweets He Settled $25M Fraud Case Because He’s Too Busy, 
USA TODAY (Nov. 19, 2016, 1:53 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2016 
/11/19/president-elect-hints-he-might-not-have-settled-if-he-werent-get-ready-for-his-inau 
guration/94123452/. 
342 Greg Sargent, Opinion, Donald Trump Explains American Politics in a Single 
Sentence, WASH. POST (Feb. 10, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line 
/wp/2016/02/10/donald-trump-explains-american-politics-in-a-single-sentence/?utm_term 
=.a4248d0771f3 (quoting Donald J. Trump television interview). 
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believe that the President and his band of traveling salesmen engaged 
in a nationwide fraudulent marketing campaign to push a personal 
coaching scam on vulnerable people who trusted him and his 
unlicensed, mislabeled seminars. President Trump promised that his 
hand-picked instructors would teach consumers his personal real estate 
secrets and mentor them on how to get rich quickly. However, the 
evidence suggests that these promises were actually all lies. Judges who 
looked at that evidence decided that reasonable jurors could conclude 
that the President committed fraud and racketeering. Even more 
concerning, the President of the United States agreed to pay $25 million 
to prevent a jury from potentially reaching just that conclusion. 
Just as these jurors could have concluded that President Trump 
committed fraud or racketeering, Congress could still reasonably 
conclude that the President’s actions constituted “high crimes or 
misdemeanors” under the impeachment clause. Although the attorneys 
in these civil lawsuits are working to resolve a settlement agreement 
with the President, any settlement agreement cannot legally effect 
Congress’ “sole” right to impeach and remove the president.343 
Moreover, the Constitution’s plain text, the framers’ intentions, and the 
past impeachment precedent strongly indicate that a president may be 
impeached for high crimes or misdemeanors committed prior to 
assuming office. Impeachment is, in this sense, a separate 
constitutional procedure that is, although more rare, coequal to the 
Electoral College. By casting votes for a president facing outstanding, 
triable accusations of criminal conduct, in this election, the public has 
effectively voted for a short-leashed, congressionally-revocable 
presidency. 
Nevertheless, the claims made in this Article are limited. This 
Article has not predicted that President Trump will be impeached, nor 
does it even argue that he should be impeached. The claim in this article 
is a more modest, but still deeply important, constitutional insight that 
President Trump legally could be impeached. This insight suggests that 
the House of Representatives should conduct an impeachment inquiry 
to settle the questions of (1) whether President Trump’s alleged fraud 
and racketeering in connection with Trump University did, in fact, 
occur; and (2), if so, whether his actions rise to the level of impeachable 
high crimes or misdemeanors. Indeed, President Trump himself should 
follow the lead of Vice Presidents Calhoun and Colfax and request that 
 
343 U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2–3. 
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the House Judiciary Committee conduct an impeachment inquiry in the 
hope that it will exonerate him and restore his reputation. 
It is true that impeachment proceedings would inevitably divert the 
nation’s leadership and attention away from addressing the public’s 
business. And yet, failing to consider impeachment of officers or 
judges that may have engaged in fraud or racketeering is a caustic 
precedent of hypocrisy and corruption. This risk is especially great in 
the case of the President. A firm Congressional insistence that 
allegations of presidential crime must be investigated is not the greatest 
risk to our republic. As the very first Federalist paper explained: 
[A] dangerous ambition more often lurks behind the specious mask 
of zeal for the rights of the people, than under the forbidding 
appearances of zeal for the firmness and efficiency of government. 
History will teach us, that the former has been found a much more 
certain road to the introduction of despotism, than the latter, and that 
of those men who have overturned the liberties of republics, the 
greatest number have begun their career, by paying an obsequious 
court to the people . . . commencing demagogues, and ending 
tyrants.344 
One hopes that President Trump’s promise to stop Americans from 
being ripped off is not just such a specious mask of zeal. Nonetheless, 
the gravity of the allegations against him have already pitted two of the 
Republic’s most treasured values against each other. On the one hand 
Americans have always believed in our electoral process. And yet, on 
the other hand, Americans have also always held the view that no one 
is above the law. Today, the Trump presidency forces Congress to 
choose between the two. In the future, the republic would be well 




344 THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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